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ABSTRACT
Political tolerance (the willingness to extend civil liberties to disliked groups) has
been disturbingly low among the American public since measurement of tolerance
began in the 1950’s. The few voters who do exhibit tolerant attitudes tend to be people
who know a great deal about politics (i.e. people high in “political expertise”).
Researchers have theorized many explanations for why political experts are more
tolerant on average; for example, experts may place more value on the legal and
normative ‘rules’ of democracy (i.e. “democratic norms”), which guarantee free speech,
or they may consider democratic norms to be more important than non-experts do, or
some other related mechanism may drive the effect. While many explanations for this
link between expertise and tolerance have been suggested, none have been directly
tested in empirical research.
The present dissertation represents the first set of studies examining how
political expertise promotes political tolerance. Three studies will examine possible
mechanisms: study one will examine the role of explicit support for democratic norms
and perceived importance of such norms; study two will examine the accessibility of
democratic values; and study three will examine implicit support for democratic values.
Interactions between these predictors will also be tested a priori (for example, not only
will explicit support and importance of democratic norms be examined individually,
x

the interaction of the two will also be analyzed as a mechanism). These studies will
inform future theory and experimental research on the causes of (and contributors to)
tolerance, and will inform policy recommendations on how to increase tolerance in a
generally intolerant public.

xi

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Overview
The present studies will examine the relationship between political expertise and
political tolerance, and will examine several possible underlying mechanisms for the oftdemonstrated effect of expertise on tolerance. First, this paper will briefly define
political tolerance and provide a review of landmark political tolerance studies and
findings, will outline the political psychological literature on key predictors of tolerance,
including political expertise, and will discuss the role of democratic norms and values in
the development and endorsement of tolerance. Further, this paper will suggest several
possible underlying mechanisms or mediators of the effect of expertise on political
tolerance: endorsement of democratic norms, accessibility of democratic norms,
internalization of democratic norms, and democratic norms importance. After outlining
a theoretical case for why these variables may undergird the relationship between
expertise and tolerance, this paper will propose a series of three studies testing all four
simple mediational pathways, as well as three moderated mediational models, each of
which tests mediation by the interaction between two of the aforementioned
mediators. Survey methods, proposed statistical treatments, and potential implications
of this research will be discussed.
1

2
Political Tolerance: Background
"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."
This absolute-free-speech sentiment, first reportedly expressed by Voltaire (1770), has
long been held as a democratic ideal of paramount importance (Jefferson, 1944; Prothro
& Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964; Mill, 1869). In reality, most Americans are not willing to
fight and die for unpopular speech; indeed they will not even tacitly allow controversial
public displays and protests (Stouffer, 1955). This disparity between ideal and fact was
first observed in a landmark political tolerance study by political scientist Samuel
Stouffer, and has vexed political theorists and scientists ever since.
In survey and experimental studies, political tolerance is typically defined as "an
individual's willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes"
(Crick, 1973; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982). Across decades of inquiry and using a
variety of dependent measures, political scientists and psychologists have replicated
Stouffer's basic finding: the American public is massively intolerant (McClosky & Brill,
1983; Prothro& Grigg, 1960; Sullivan et al, 1982; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). The
psychological underpinnings of tolerance (or rather, mass intolerance) thus demand
scientific inquiry.
Definition
Political tolerance has historically been defined by political theorists and social
scientists alike as individual democratic citizens’ willingness to permit or allow civil
liberties to be extended to objectionable groups or offensive (but innocuous) ideas
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(Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982; Crick, 1973). While the specific issue
of which rights constitute “civil liberties” may vary by country, in the United States
tolerance typically refers to civil liberties granted in the First Amendment of the US
Constitution, particularly non-religious rights that pertain to freedom of speech and
expression (Prothro & Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964). These rights include freedom of
speech (both literal and symbolic, in the form of attire or behavior), freedom of
assembly, freedom to protest the government, freedom of the press, and freedom to
petition (U.S. Const. art. I).
In terms of political theory and psychology, political tolerance represents a
respect for the procedural norms of the democratic process, as well as belief that the
laws of a country should be applied equally to all members of society—including those
who are deemed personally repellant. In addition, tolerance represents a willingness to
overlook one’s initial prejudices against a group or idea, and allow that group or idea to
be expressed in the public sphere without suppression—in this way, the expression of
tolerance attitudes may be psychologically similar to other forms of effortful bias or
prejudice suppression (e.g. Devine, 1989; Lepore& Brown, 2002).
It should also be emphasized, however, that permitting a group to exercise its
free speech rights does not imply a change in anti-group attitude on the part of the
tolerant individual—in fact, tolerance is almost exclusively defined by the willingness to
extend free speech rights in the presence of active distaste for the group or idea being
expressed (Sullivan et al, 1982). Sullivan et al (1979) perhaps best expressed this
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contingency of tolerance in their landmark book Political Tolerance and American
Democracy: “Tolerance implies a willingness to ‘put up with’ those things one rejects or
opposes. Politically, it implies a willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests
one opposes.” (p.2).
History of Research on Political Tolerance
The umbrella term “political tolerance” and the academic study of the construct
gained intellectual currency in the 1950s, with the publication of Samuel Stouffer’s
seminal work, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (1955; Hazama, 2010).In the
spring of 1954, Stouffer and colleagues surveyed the tolerance attitudes of a stratified
sample of 4,933 United State citizens from wide swathes of the country, including
political elites and individuals at all education and SES levels. Respondents were
assessed for their general, abstract support for free speech rights, and were then asked
whether communists, socialists, and atheists should be permitted to engage in the
following free speech acts: teaching in public schools, publishing books to be held in the
local libraries, holding public speeches, and working freely at a job in the community.
Stouffer’s results were troubling: while the vast majority of respondents
supported the notion of tolerance in the abstract (roughly 90% or more in most groups),
a majority denied speech rights to all three target groups (with one-third or fewer
providing tolerant responses; Stouffer, 1955). Stouffer noted several factors that
appeared to promote tolerance, most of which have been frequently replicated in later
studies, using a variety of methods: education, political activism, living in an urban area,
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experience with diversity, and political elite status (being either an elected official or a
community leader with experience and agency in politics). Of these predictors, Stouffer
found the largest effect was that of education, and he considered the effect of
education on tolerance to be paramount. Stouffer theorized that education made
individuals more tolerant by not only exposing them to a wide variety of diverse ideas
(some correct, some not), but also by providing a strong instruction in the norms and
values of the democratic system. He theorized that political elites were more tolerant
for the same reasons— they experienced high exposure to a variety of perspectives, and
had a high incentive to accept and internalize democratic values. Notably, political
ideology and party were not strong predictors of tolerance, a pattern that would
continue to be replicated in further research.
Stouffer’s revelation that the majority of the American public was massively
intolerant inspired a flurry of research and concern. McClosky (1964) and Prothro and
Grigg (1960) soon replicated Stouffer’s general finding that people support equal free
speech rights theoretically but blanch once a target group or example of a particular
free speech act is provided. Later replications by some of the same researchers found
this result again on a new cohort of respondents (McClosky & Brill, 1983). Research also
replicated all of Stouffer’s key predictors of greater tolerance, particularly the value of
education and political involvement and expertise (Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Jackman,
1972; Nunn et al, 1978). Again, regardless of ideology or partisanship, people who were
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engaged and knowledgeable about politics were vastly more likely to provide a tolerant
response, as were the more educated.
Seeing the link between education and political knowledge and tolerance,
Stouffer (1955) anticipated that, as educational opportunities increased for younger
generations, so too would tolerance for objectionable groups. Seeking to test this
hypothesis, Davis (1975) analyzed survey data collected by the National Opinion
Research Center (NORC) in 1972 and found significantly higher tolerance from Stouffer’s
original sample. Nunn et al (1978) reported similar increases in tolerance (while again
replicating the effects of education and political elitehood) several years later, using
another NORC survey. Several other political scientists reported similar apparent
increases in tolerance across this period (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996).
However, despite increases in education for younger cohorts, both Nunn et al
(1978) and Davis (1975) found increased tolerance across all cohort groups, including
older adults and individuals with less education. Lawrence (1976) criticized this apparent
maturational effect by noting a clear problem in all prior studies’ use of a limited
number of target groups: since Stouffer (1955), every tolerance researcher had
examined tolerance for communists, socialists, and atheists, and attitudes towards
those target groups had shifted in the past two decades. A new method of measuring
tolerance was desperately needed.
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Trends in Measurement of Tolerance
All large-scale studies of political tolerance from Stouffer’s (1955) to Nunn et al
(1978) used the same target groups for all participants (communists, socialists, and
atheists). All three target groups were liberal in ideology, and were rapidly becoming
more accepted by society during the period that tolerance was observed to “increase”.
Thus, Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) set out to formulate a new measure of
political tolerance that would be ideology-neutral and responsive to the attitudes of the
individual survey taker.
Sullivan et al (1982) argued that granting free speech rights to a group only
qualified as political tolerance in cases where the target group was actually disliked.
Thus, asking a far-left voter if he or she would allow a “socialist” to speak might
frequently be meaningless as a measure of tolerance, since the voter might have no
hatred for the socialist or socialist messages that needed to be suppressed in order to
provide a tolerant response. At the very least, individuals are more likely to provide a
tolerant response to a target group they only mildly dislike when compared to a group
they like least of all (Gibson, 1985). Theoretically, a ‘tolerant’ response is typically
considered to only be possible when the target group (or speech) in question is
distasteful to the voter, otherwise speech isn’t being permitted or tolerated so much as
passively accepted (see Gibson, 1992). Thus, if public opinion on Stouffer’s target groups
changed over time (which it demonstrably did; Sullivan et al, 1982) to the point where
socialists, communists, and atheists were no longer strongly reviled, the existing
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tolerance measure could not be said to be truly capturing tolerance, particularly if there
remained another, unexamined target group to which participants would provide a less
tolerant response than they provided for Stouffer’s groups (Gibson, 2005). Furthermore,
all of Stouffer’s (1955) target groups were left-leaning, inserting an ideological bias into
the measure that could lead to more apparently intolerant responses in conservatives.
One previous study (Herson & Hofstetter, 1975) had attempted to correct for this bias
by asking participants about the free speech rights of one left-wing and one right-wing
group, but Sullivan et al (1982) instead proposed that it was necessary to ensure that
respondents actively disliked the target group they were being asked about before
tolerance could be meaningfully assessed.
Hence, Sullivan et al (1982) created perhaps the most frequently-used measure
of political tolerance, the content-controlled measure of tolerance, which remains in use
today. In this measure, participants are able to select their own target group, using what
the authors called the least-liked procedure: participants are provided with a list of
groups in politics that are frequently disliked, and are instructed to select the one they
like the least. The subsequent tolerance question stems are then filled in to the survey
item stems, to make the survey items pertain to the group that the participant selected
(e.g. “Members of the _____ should be banned from holding public office.”). The
possible least-liked groups range from the KKK to pro- and anti-abortionists, to fascists
and communists, and participants are permitted to select an alternate group that is
unlisted as well.
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Using this measure, Sullivan et al (1979, 1982) found that tolerance had not, in
fact, increased since the 1950s; when ensuring that the target group was one
respondents strongly disliked, the majority of the American public remained intolerant.
Research using this measure also replicated many of Stouffer and others’ findings
regarding the factors that predicted tolerance: expertise, acceptance of democratic
norms, education, and political involvement all predicted tolerance, whereas ideology
did not, for example. The validity of Sullivan et al’s (1982) measure became widely
apparent and was adopted by many others soon after. This measure of political
tolerance has since been used in a wide variety of survey and experimental studies, and
is frequently used in contemporary research.
Popular alternatives to Sullivan et al’s (1982) content-controlled measure of
political tolerance include Gibson and Bingham’s (1982) measure, as well as the
tolerance for diversity items in the World Values Survey (WVS) and the tolerance items
in the annual General Social Survey (GSS). Since all three measures are also frequently
used in the tolerance literature, they merit some discussion. Rather than controlling the
content of questions to ensure that the target group is one the respondent dislikes (and
using that target group throughout), Gibson and Bingham’s (1982) questions present
respondents with a variety of civil liberties scenarios, with target groups that differ itemby-item(e.g. “A radio station, which permits the reading of an anti-Semitic poem over
the air should have its FCC license revoked.”), with some items specifying no target
group whatsoever (e.g. “In their fight against crime the police should be entitled to use
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wiretaps and other devices for listening in on private conversations.”). This measure,
then, may be closer to Stouffer’s original “abstract” measures, which probe for general,
notional support for tolerance more so than actual tolerance in practice. However,
tolerance research using this measure has frequently replicated the same pattern of
results found using alternate measures, including those of Stouffer (1955) and Sullivan
et al (1982): the key constructs that typically predict tolerance (education, political
expertise, support for democratic norms, and so on) do so regardless of measure (see
Gibson, 1992, for an extensive review; Bobo & Licari, 1989).
In addition to the Gibson and Bingham (1982) and Sullivan et al (1982) measures,
tolerance is assessed slightly differently in the World Value Survey and the General
Social Survey. First, it should be noted that while the WVS is a widely-distributed
international survey administered to an immensely wide swathe of people living in a
variety of cultures, social-economic strata, and governmental systems, its definition of
tolerance is too lax to be useful for the typical researcher examining political tolerance
in a developed or longstanding democracy. The WVS’s tolerance questions ask
respondents, for example, if homosexuality is ever “justified” (with options of “always
justified”, “sometimes justified”, “rarely justified”, and “never justified”; Corneo&
Jeanne, 2009). Similar questions exist for racial minorities and people of religions that
differ from the respondent. In this way, while the WVS may be a very fruitful measure
for those studying general tolerance for diversity in developing nations, its utility is
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limited for those who are interested in studying tolerance that goes beyond the mere
right for a target group to exist.
The General Social Survey, however, operationalizes tolerance in a manner more
similar to Stouffer’s (1955) framework and is useful as a point of comparison with other
measures used in the US and Western Europe. The GSS uses an eighteen-item measure
of tolerance, which inquires about the rights of six target groups (communists, atheists,
homosexuals, militarists, Muslims, and racists) and three free speech rights (the right to
hold a public speech, the right to teach a college, and the right to place books in the
library; Davis, 1975; Postic,2011). These tolerance items have been collected on a
stratified sample of the American public annually since 1975, and while some of the
target groups are rapidly becoming irrelevant (e.g., most people support free speech for
LGBT people), the general pattern of results has consistently held, and confers with the
findings reported using other methods: education, political elite status, political
expertise, and support for democratic values all positively predict tolerance, regardless
of target group (Gibson, 1992; Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Chandler & Tsai, 2001).
Key Determinants of Tolerance
It is clear that across a variety of measures, a number of common trends in
political tolerance can be consistently found (Gibson, 1992). In developing and
presenting a theoretical framework of tolerance and its most fundamental
determinants, it is useful to review these landmark predictors, some of which will be
included in the present set of studies. The key, frequently-replicated determinants of
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tolerance can be grouped into two subcategories: predictors or determinants of
tolerance that deal with the respondent’s attitudes toward the target group (i.e. the
group being either tolerated or not tolerated), and predictors that have to deal with the
psychological or political traits of the survey respondent him or herself.
Target-group-based determinants of tolerance. As the work of Sullivan et al
(1982) made clear, much of what determines whether a survey respondent will provide
a tolerant or intolerant judgment depends on the respondent’s feelings about the target
group. Under most contemporary theoretical frameworks of political tolerance, a
tolerant judgment can only be made when the target group is hated or disliked by the
individual responding; however, in the presence of such target-group hatred the
majority of individuals are demonstrably intolerant (see Kuklinski et al., 1992 & 1993, for
related evidence). The respondents’ relationship to the target group is thus a strong
predictor of tolerance in and of itself. Since Sullivan et al’s landmark book introducing
the least-liked tolerance procedure, many tolerance researchers have examined various
other aspects pertaining to how an individual feels about the target group whose civil
liberties are being discussed, and have found several recurring strong predictors.
Magnitude of dislike or hatred of group. First, the intensity with which a person
hates the target group is a strong predictor of their level of tolerance for the group.
While Sullivan et al (1982) and all researchers using Sullivan et al’s least-liked measure
of tolerance could be certain that the target group whose civil liberties were being
judged was, in fact, disliked by the respondent, there are still observable individual
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differences in the degree to which the respondent hates the target group. Sullivan et al
(1982) even found an effect of level of dislike on tolerance in their initial spate of
studies, with more hate predicting higher intolerance. Gibson (1992; 1989b) asked
participants about their tolerance for not only their least-liked group, but their second,
third and fourth least-liked groups, and found that there was far greater intolerance for
the more intensely disliked targets. In addition, the more a target group is seen as a
violator of social mores and norms, the less tolerant respondents typically are of that
group’s free speech rights (Marcus et al, 1995; Gibson & Gouws, 2003).
Threatingness of group. Another strong determinant of individuals’ political
tolerance judgments is their perception of the target group as a social (rather than
personal) threat. The more a political group is perceived to challenge society’s values or
pose a risk to the public or to the respondents’ way of life, the more likely the
respondent is to provide an intolerant response (Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Huddy et al,
2005; Shamir, 1991; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Davis & Silver, 2004; Sullivan et al, 1993).
This may even explain, in part, why tolerance for Stouffer’s original target groups has
increased over time: people have become more comfortable with communists,
socialists, and atheists in a post-Red Scare, post-Berlin wall era where these groups are
not looming specters. Similarly, Davis and Silver (2004) demonstrated that respondents
were less tolerant of target groups when the target groups were framed as societal
threats; personal threat did not influence tolerance in this case. Outside of the United
States, McIntosh et al (2005) reported that a key determinant of tolerance for
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Bulgarians and Romanians was respondents’ perception of the target groups (ethnic
minority groups in the region) as threatening to the majority and to the homeland.
Sullivan et al (1982) also noted that the target groups toward which respondents were
the most intolerant were those that actively advocated violence and rebellion, or had a
history of participating in violent and revolutionary acts, which could be presumed to
contribute to how threatening a least-liked group is perceived to be.
Political power or influence of group. In addition to participants’ dislike of the
target group and their perceptions of the target group as dangerous to society, another
crucial target-based determinant of tolerance is whether the target has the potential for
political influence. In a dissertation examining differences in tolerance across multiple
nations, Hutchinson (2007) noted that one international predictor of tolerance was the
influence the target group had over the nation’s existing political structures; in nations
where strongly disliked groups had the actual potential of overtaking the government or
being elected into office, respondents were far less tolerant of those groups’ civil
liberties. In addition, some research demonstrates that tolerance is lower for disliked
groups that have actually been elected into office (or have access to channels of political
influence) than for disliked groups that pose an external social threat and have little
power (Shamir 1991; Gibson and Gouws 2003; but see Marcus et al, 1995).
Again, this makes sense in light of Sullivan et al’s (1982) findings, as well as the
illusory increases in tolerance for Stouffer’s target groups. First, Sullivan et al (1979,
1982) found the highest tolerance levels among participants who selected the John
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Birch Society and fascists. These groups had no actionable political influence at the time
of the authors’ studies; so much so that it was (and is) hard to fathom members of such
groups being elected to office or swaying public opinion. Therefore, the actual
sociotropic risks posed by such groups expressing their views in the public sphere are
relatively small. Similarly, tolerance has increased for Stouffer’s (1955) target groups
(communists, socialists, and atheists) as fear of communism and the international
political influence of communism has decreased. Thus, tolerance is not only influenced
by how strongly a respondent hates the group being considered, or by how distasteful
or threatening the group’s views are, but also by whether the group has any true
influence on society or politics.
Respondent-based determinants of tolerance. Survey and experimental
research has also consistently revealed a number of predictors of tolerance that occur at
the respondent level. These predictors have been replicated in numerous political
tolerance studies using a variety of sampling methods and measures, including the leastliked measure of political tolerance as well as more general measures such as the GSS,
Gibson and Bingham’s (1982), and the world value survey. Respondent-based
determinants of tolerance include psychological and personality trait variables that are
relatively unchanging within participants (such as authoritarianism), as well as social and
experiential trait variables that can alter with life experience or across development
(such as education or political involvement).
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Psychological trait variables. Survey and experimental research has outlined a
bevy of personality factors that influence how readily a person tolerates groups they
find abhorrent. Among personality factors, low self-esteem, high neuroticism and low
openness to experience have all been linked to low political tolerance (Marcus et al,
1995, Sullivan et al, 1982). Other individual differences such as authoritarianism have
also been linked to tolerance, with more authoritarian and right-wing authoritarian
participants displaying far less tolerance than average (Gibson, 1987; Adorno et al, 1950;
Stouffer, 1955; McCloskey and Brill, 1983; Peffley and Sigelman, 1990; Feldman 2003,
2005). A variety of situational threat manipulations have also demonstrably lowered
individuals' political tolerance (Chanley, 1994; Theiss-Morse, 1993).
Political elite status. Political elites and individuals who hold political office are
more tolerant than members of the mass public (McClosky, 1964; McClosky & Brill,
1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Stouffer, 1955). Samuel Stouffer
hypothesized that people who were involved in politics were better informed about
society's core democratic values than average, and were more motivated to uphold
them. As a result, such elites were capable of pausing and taking a "sober second
thought" when faced with an objectionable group; he argued that this thoughtful pause
afforded elites greater tolerance (Stouffer, 1955). With this argument Stouffer
essentially suggested that tolerance judgments were psychologically similar to other
forms of bias correction (Devine, 1989; Wegener &Petty, 2001; Lepore& Brown, 2002).
In addition, Sullivan and colleagues (1993) have found evidence that political elite status
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predicts increased tolerance in several multi-national samples (including the U.S., Great
Britain, and New Zealand; this appears to be true in Israeli samples as well; Sullivan et al
1985, Gibson, 1998) and are less likely to exhibit “slippage” from abstract support for
civil liberties to support for the rights of specific targets (Sullivan & Transue, 1999).
Patriotism. A large body of research on national pride demonstrates that
extreme levels of national pride (in the form of nationalism) can lead to intolerance in
the form of outgroup derogation, outgroup hostility, and prejudice (Van Evera,
1994;Feshbach, 1994; Blank & Schmidt, 1993, 1997; Kosterman Feshbach, 1989).
Patriotism, however, is a level of more modest (but not low) national pride, and is
associated with commitment to maintaining the group’s standards, including increased
commitment to democratic values and maintenance of group standards (Turner, Hogg,
Oakes, Reicher, &Wetherell, 1987; Brewer, 1999; 2009 Noelle-Neumann & Kocher,
1987; Topf, Mohler, Heath, &Trompeter, 1990).
Participation and activism. Another robust finding in the political tolerance
literature is that activists and people who participate frequently in politics are more
tolerant than members of the mass public (McClosky, 1964; McClosky & Brill, 1983;
McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Stouffer, 1955). Samuel Stouffer
hypothesized that people who were involved in politics were better informed about
society's core democratic values than average, and were more motivated to uphold
them. As a result, such elites were capable of pausing and taking a "sober second
thought" when faced with an objectionable group; he argued that this thoughtful pause
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afforded elites greater tolerance (Stouffer, 1955). With this argument Stouffer
essentially suggested that tolerance judgments were psychologically similar to other
forms of bias correction (Devine, 1989; Wegener & Petty, 2001; Lepore& Brown, 2002).
Stouffer’s sample did in fact find that higher levels of political involvement and
engagement promoted tolerance (1955); more recent research by Peffley and
Rohrschneider (2003) provides even stronger support for the positive relationship
between involvement and tolerance, particularly for unconventional forms of
participation (such as protesting) that require the exercise of civil liberties to express
dissent, in contrast to more conventional and uncontested forms of participation (such
as voting).
Education. One possible reason that elites, experts, and activists are more
tolerant is that they tend to be better-educated (Sullivan et al, 1982). Controlling for
political involvement, more years of education typically spell greater tolerance (Prothro
& Grigg, 1960; Sniderman, 1984). Noting this pattern in his data, Stouffer hypothesized
the mediating role of diversity of experience: the educated have more exposure to a
variety of individuals, he argued, and through this exposure learn how to peacefully
coexist with different others. This explanation for elite tolerance has generally not held
over time, however—political knowledge and experience have been found to be highly
confounded with education, instead (Sullivan et al, 1982; Bobo & Licari, 1989).
Relatedly, an international study by Duch and Gibson (1992) suggested that education
does not always promote greater tolerance; Zaller (1992) explained these findings by
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positing that education only furnishes tolerance when it provides students with contact
to unfamiliar groups and views (and thus that mere gains in cognitive ability or general
knowledge are not sufficient to boost tolerance). Several alternate hypothesis
accounting for the relationship between education and tolerance remain in need of
testing, particularly the hypothesis that both political elite status and education increase
commitment to democratic norms, which may itself lead to a more absolute-freespeech, tolerant view (McClosky & Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al,
1978).In developing Eastern European countries, increases in education over the past
twenty years has not brought with it related increases in tolerance (Hodson et al, 1994;
Coenders & Scheepers, 2003), which researchers have interpreted as a sign that
democratic values must first permeate through the cultural and educational system and
be broadly accepted before education can prompt tolerance (see below for more on the
influence of democratic values).
Expertise. One of the most robust and oft-replicated findings in the political
tolerance literature is that individuals who are highly informed and sophisticated in the
realm of politics are far more likely to express tolerance (Cacioppo et al, 1996; Zaller,
1990; Krosnick, 1990; Golebiowska, 1999; Price & Ottati, 2012). Relatedly, Duch and
Gibson (1992) and others (Powell, 1986; Lijphart, 1968) also note that individuals high in
political sophistication (a construct highly related to, and probably synonymous with,
political expertise; Lawrence, 2003; Delli-Karpini& Keeter, 1993; Krosnick, 1990) are
higher in tolerance as well. This tendency for political experts to be tolerant appears to
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be ingrained: Marcus et al (1995) call political expertise a “predisposition” to tolerance,
and expert tolerance may even be relatively automatic (see Price & Ottati, 2012;
Hazama, 2010). In fact, one of the frequently-presented explanations for why political
elite status (and political involvement) predicts tolerance is because the politically elite
have a greater knowledge of politics and the “rules of the game” overall (Sullivan et al,
1993; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Jackman (1978), in a reanalysis of Stouffer’s original
data noted that most of the difference between elite and nonelite respondents on
tolerance could be accounted for by differences in political knowledge (Sullivan et al,
1993).
Knowledge about politics seems to lead individuals to have greater respect for
equal protection of civil liberties regardless of group. This may occur because political
experts have greater support for democratic values; alternatively, this may occur
because democratic values are more accessible to experts than novices when forming a
tolerance judgment, because experts have internalized democratic values to a greater
degree, or because they consider democratic values to be more important than novices
do, and thereby assign it more weight when forming their decision (Krosnick, 1990;
McClosky & Brill, 1983; see below for a more complete list). The exact nature of the
mechanism by which experts are more tolerant than novices has been frequently
theorized but hasn’t been directly tested, though many theorize that political experts’
higher support for democratic values is involved (Stouffer,1955; McClosky, 1964;
McClosky & Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Price & Ottati, 2012).
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Support for democratic norms and values. Research on political tolerance
suggests that commitment to democratic norms (hereafter used interchangeably with
“support for democratic values”), predicts tolerance for disliked groups (Bobo & Licari,
1989; Gibson, 1993).Support for democratic norms theoretically includes the following:
support for democracy as the ideal governmental system, support for procedural
fairness, equality under the law, and support for pluralistic representation (Hutchinson,
2007; Sullivan et al, 1982; Sniderman, 1996).Sniderman (1996) argues that support for
democratic values is similar theoretically to the ‘abstract’ tolerance measured by
Stouffer’s (1955) group-free measures. However, he and others (e.g. Hutchinson, 2007;
Peffley et al, 2001) also argue that support for democratic values and tolerance are
themselves distinct constructs despite this overlap, as support for democratic values
reflects general philosophical respect for the “rules of the [political] game”, whereas
political tolerance is the ability to actually uphold these rules in the most difficult (and
specific) instances. To clarify, Sniderman (1996) refers to intolerance as a ‘failure’ to
apply democratic norms to the question of whether a particular group has the right to
engage in a particular form of speech. Thus, support for democratic norms can be seen
as a necessary but insufficient condition for tolerance: it helps explain and predict
tolerance, but is not synonymous with tolerance, as many individuals who support
democratic values in the abstract do not uphold it consistently when provided specifics.
While they are related but distinct concepts, support for democratic values is
among the strongest and most consistently-observed predictors of tolerance
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(Hutchinson, 2007; Sullivan et al, 1982, Gibson, 1996; 1998; Gibson and Gouws, 2003;
Marcus et al 1995; and Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003). This effect holds in
international samples as well (Duch and Gibson, 1992). The relationship between
support for democratic norms and political tolerance has also been found using a variety
of measures of tolerance, both ‘least-liked’ and otherwise, indicating a robust effect
(Gibson, 1992; Sullivan et al, 1985). Some evidence suggests that people who support
democratic values are also more likely to maintain tolerance consistently (Sullivan &
Transue, 1999; Lawrence, 1976; Sullivan et al, 1982; Gibson & Bingham, 1983; McClosky
& Brill, 1983; Gibson 1987; 1992). Choosing to tolerate the views of a despised group
inherently involves a tradeoff between values, and pits democratic norms against
practical concerns such as cost, political correctness, and safety (Hutchinson, 2007;
Sullivan et al, 1982). Since tolerance judgments involve such a plentitude of competing
considerations, reminding participants of the possible negative consequences of free
speech (e.g. riots, political influence, public offense) can frequently make them less
tolerant (see, e.g. Kuklinski et al 1991; 1993). However, survey respondents who
strongly support democratic norms are far less likely to make this tradeoff, and hence
are the most likely to remain resolutely tolerant, even in the face of a truly hated or
potentially dangerous group, or even a prime that makes riots and dangerous
consequences more accessible (Nelson et al, 1997).
Not surprisingly, support for democratic values is associated with political
expertise, and may even account for the oft-noted relationship between expertise and
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tolerance (Radin, 2006; Jones, 1979). The exact nature of the relationship between
democratic values, political expertise, and tolerance currently remain unknown and
untested, however, and make up the fundamental question of the present set of
studies. The impact of democratic values on tolerance may even help account for the
relationship between political elite status and tolerance, as political elites are more
likely to value the governmental processes of which they are a part, and are more likely
to see themselves and democratic standard-bearers (Stouffer, 1955; Gibson & Bingham,
1983; Gibson, 1987; Lawrence, 1976; McClosky & Brill, 1983). Elites and activists
generally have high commitment to democratic norms, and may therefore appear more
tolerant than non-elites because their attitudes toward civil liberties are more accessible
than their attitudes toward disliked groups or their fear of negative consequences of
tolerance (Marcus et al, 1995; Sullivan et al, 1982). Further, political elite status and
political expertise are often seen and analyzed as similar constructs in the political
tolerance literature (as elites are more likely to be experts and vice-versa; Zaller, 1990;
Krosnick, 1990; Golebiowska, 1999), and it stand to reason that both high political status
and high political knowledge bring with them a strong commitment to the values of the
political system.
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Expertise, Democratic Values, and Tolerance
Political expertise and support for democratic values are among the two most
significant and frequently-replicated predictors of political tolerance. In addition, these
two constructs’ respective influences on tolerance have often been hypothesized to be
related in some way (typically using language suggestive of mediation), though this
relationship has never been tested. Sullivan and Transue (1999) state the
fundamentality of these two predictors well: “In general, political experts exhibit higher
levels of applied tolerance than do political novices, and in all cases, strong beliefs in
democratic values constrain citizens to be more tolerant in practical situations.” (p.635).
Political experts are hypothesized to have greater knowledge of (and support for) the
political “rules of the game” than nonexperts, who are by definition less familiar with
democratic laws and concepts such as procedural fairness; Thus, political experts may
be more tolerant than novices because they have greater support for democratic values
(Jones, 1979; Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al, 1979). In addition, however, political experts
may be more likely to enter democratic values into consideration when forming a
tolerance judgment, in part because of their greater knowledge and familiarity of
political issues—in which case, the relationship between expertise and tolerance may be
accounted for by the increased accessibility of democratic norms amongst experts
(Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Price & Ottati, 2012). Further, experts may have more
rehearsed, ‘automatic’ (or implicit) support for democratic norms than novices, again
due to knowing and thinking a great deal more about politics than novices, and experts’
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implicit attitude of democratic values support may explain their high tolerance (for a
related argument see Price & Ottati, 2012). Finally, political experts may assign more
importance to democratic values, relative to novices (who may assign greater
importance to other factors, such as their attitude toward the target group), and thus
are more tolerant as a result. The exact mechanism by which tolerance, political
expertise, and support for democratic values are related is unclear at this point. Since
expertise and democratic values are two of the central predictors of tolerance, and
since their relationship has been hypothesized but not tested to date, these possible
mediational pathways are overdue for study.
Possible Mechanisms for the Relationship Between Expertise and Tolerance
The relationship between expertise and tolerance has been frequently noted,
but theoretical explanations for the relationship have been presented without being
subject to any empirical testing. Many of the underlying proposed mechanisms for the
link between expertise and political tolerance involves the influence of democratic
values support, though these proposed relationships have also been left unexplored.
The possibility that democratic norm support mediates the relationship between
expertise and tolerance is especially in need of testing, as it has been proposed
theoretically by numerous researchers but left unexplored (Marcus et al, 1995;
Sniderman, 1975; Golebiowska, 1999) and since it is clear that democratic norm support
and expertise are in fact correlated (Golebiowska, 1999).
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However, support for a set of values could mediate the relationship between
expertise and tolerance by several methods: for example, explicit value support might
not be as strong a predictor of tolerance (or as strong a mediator of the relationship
between expertise and tolerance) as implicit support for democratic values.
Alternatively, support for democratic values itself might not by the true key predictor of
tolerance; it may be more important to examine whether or not a respondent actually
considers democratic values at all when forming a tolerance judgment (in which case
the accessibility of democratic values may be the mediator, not support). Finally, the
relationship between expertise and tolerance might be mediated instead by the
importance individuals place on democratic values. This paper will examine several
possible mechanisms for the relationship between expertise and tolerance, all involving
mediation by constructs related to democratic values.
Support for democratic values. First, the relationship between expertise and
tolerance may be mediated by explicit support for democratic norms and values. In
other words, experts simply support the procedural “rules of the game” at a greater rate
than non-experts, and are more tolerant as a result. This relationship was intimated by
many tolerance researchers (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al, 1982), but was first explicitly
stated as a mediational relationship by Sniderman (1975), who proposed that political
experts were more supportive of the norms and values of the democratic system, by
virtue of their greater knowledge and greater attachment to the realm of politics, and
that this was responsible for their greater willingness to allot free speech rights to
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groups they found despicable. Golebiowska (1999) found some preliminary support for
this, though she did not test the mediation effect directly: female respondents were
found to be less tolerant as a result of lower commitment to democratic norms and
lower political expertise, and the possibility that the latter mediated the relationship of
the former was presented but was not within the scope of her research. It is high time,
then, for research to directly examine whether explicit endorsement of democratic
values mediates the link between expertise and tolerance.
Accessibility of democratic values. A great deal of research suggests that
forming a tolerance judgment is usually a relatively automatic process, similar perhaps
to bias correction (e.g. Devine, 1989), that occurs without much conscious cognitive
appraisal of competing tradeoffs and considerations (e.g. Kuklinski et al, 1991, 1993;
Price & Ottati, 2012). While it may be normatively ideal for a voter to consider many
factors when forming a tolerance judgment (such as the consequences of the speech,
democratic norms, attitudes toward the target group, and the consequences of speech
repression, to name a few), most people instead form swift, knee-jerk decisions that are
limited in scope and are susceptible to framing and priming effects (Nelson et al, 1997;
Shamir & Sullivan, 1983). Indeed, political tolerance research involving both framing
(Nelson et al, 1997) and motivation (Kuklinski et al, 1991; 1993; Price & Ottati, 2012)
indicates that tolerance judgments are quite malleable on the basis of which factors
respondents are pressed to consider (and which to overlook). This suggests that the key
mediator between expertise and tolerance may not be individuals’ support for
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democratic norms, but rather how readily accessible democratic norms are to
individuals in general. Thus, mere support for democratic norms may not be the most
useful variable to examine as a mediator of the link between expertise and tolerance;
after all, there is a great deal of ‘slippage’ from abstract support for civil liberties and
specific tolerance judgments. Instead, experts may be more tolerant than political
novices because democratic norms are more accessible when they are forming their
appraisals of tolerance. In such case, democratic value accessibility would be expected
to mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance rather than mere
endorsement of democratic values, as tacit support for democratic values is quite
distinct from actually taking that support into consideration when forming a judgment
Implicit support for democratic norms. Some evidence suggests that while
explicit support for democratic values may predict tolerance, implicit support of
democratic values may explain variance in tolerance more effectively. Experts appear to
be tolerant ‘automatically’, as their responses remain tolerant even when asked to
respond to questions while distracted (Price & Ottati, 2012), suggesting that the
influence democratic values has on expert tolerance may not be conscious or
deliberative; Relatedly, high tolerance appears to occur as a relatively automatic ‘kneejerk’, rather than as the result of slow, effortful conscious processing (Kuklinski et al,
1991, 1992). This all implies that while explicit support of democratic values may predict
tolerance, implicit democratic values attitudes may explain variance in tolerance more
effectively, and may better mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance.
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Many individuals who explicitly support democratic values may throw their values out
the window when responding to specific tolerance questions involving a reviled target
group, or when reminded of competing considerations (such as safety or public
outrage). This may dilute the ability of explicit democratic values support to predict
tolerance. The very presence of ‘slippage’ from abstract tolerance to specific
(in)tolerance is itself a reflection of the fact that explicit support for democratic values
does not always lead to a tolerant response (Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Stouffer, 1955;
Peffley & Rohrsnieder, 2003). Further, explicit-reported support for democratic values
may be an imperfect reflection of democratic values support, especially considering
that most participants are aware of the ‘correct’, socially desirable response to such
questions (e.g. Ganster et al, 1993). The present set of studies will be the first to
examine whether political experts have a greater internalized support for democratic
values, and will test whether this implicit attitude mediates the expertise-tolerance link.
Greater importance of democratic norms. Finally, experts may be more tolerant
than novices simply because they place greater importance on democratic values when
assessing tolerance scenarios. Attitude importance is crucial in determining whether an
attitude will influence actual behavior, and also helps predict whether an attitude will
be susceptible to attempts at persuasion or will influence other attitudes toward related
objects (Krosnick, 1988; Boninger et al, 1995). As has already been mentioned, tolerance
often involves tradeoffs between numerous values and factors, not all of which are
consciously considered by the typical respondent (Kuklinski et al, 1991; 1993). Hence,
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general democratic values support may be less useful as a predictor of tolerance than an
individuals’ explicit rating of the importance of democratic values. If an individual
considers democratic freedoms and norms to be paramount, they are likely to consider
such values when forming a tolerance judgment, and if they feel democratic values are
relatively unimportant they are likely to ignore them, regardless of their level of explicit
endorsement. Political experts typically place a great deal of interest and importance
on political issues, however, and are probably more likely to consider democratic values
relevant (and important) when coming to a decision about tolerance scenarios
(Krosnick, 1988). Therefore the present studies will also examine whether individuals’
perceived importance of democratic values mediates the link between expertise and
tolerance.
Possible interactions/ moderated mediational pathways. In addition, the
relationship between expertise and tolerance may be mediated by an interaction
between two of the constructs listed above (i.e., a mediational path outlined above may
be moderated by another predictor). Three such possible relationships are explored
below.
Explicit support and importance of democratic values. The effect of expertise on
tolerance might be moderated by the interaction between explicit support for
democratic norms and participants’ perceived importance of democratic norms. That is,
the positive link between expertise and tolerance may only be present among
individuals who both support democratic values and consider such values important and
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worthy of consideration and “weight” when forming tolerance judgments (e.g. Miller &
Krosnick, 2000). Thus, the interaction between support and importance should be
examined as a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship.
Explicit support and accessibility of democratic values. Similarly, explicit support
for democratic values might only influence tolerance when such support is readily
accessible (see, for example, work by Iyengar et al, 1982; and Behr & Iyengar, 1985,
suggesting that for an issue to influence public opinion, it must be made accessible
through media “agenda setting’ or some other form of priming that calls the issue to
mind; and work by Srull & Wyer, 1979, suggesting that for information to influence a
judgment, that information must be readily accessible or made accessible). In this case,
the accessibility of democratic values determines whether or not support for democratic
values is granted “weight” in tolerance judgments. This effect of accessibility may
moderate any mediational path between expertise, support for democratic norms, and
tolerance. Accordingly, the possible interaction between explicit support for democratic
norms and democratic norms accessibility should be examined as a further mediator of
the relationship between expertise and tolerance.
Accessibility and implicit support for democratic values. It is a further possibility
that the interaction between accessibility of democratic values and implicit support for
democratic values might better explain the relationship between expertise and
tolerance. Implicit support for democratic values may be a more ‘pure’ measure of
participants’ attitudes toward democratic norms, as discussed above; In addition, the

32
influence of implicit support of democratic norms on tolerance may be moderated by
how readily accessible democratic values are to participants. Accordingly, the
interaction between accessibility and implicit support should be examined as a mediator
of the expertise-tolerance relationship.

CHAPTER TWO
THE PRESENT STUDIES
Overview
While democratic values have long been theorized to be a mediator of the
relationship between expertise and tolerance (Sniderman, 1975), this body of research
presents the first direct empirical tests of this relationship. Three studies will examine
the possible mediational pathways between expertise, democratic values, and tolerance
specified above. In each of the three studies, political expertise and tolerance will be
assessed; however in each study at least two distinct constructs related to democratic
values will be measured and assessed as mediators of the expertise-tolerance
relationship, as well as a possible interaction between the two proposed mediators (see
below for details). The three studies will examine these potential mediational
relationships rather than one large study containing all possible mediators, because with
the inclusion of each additional measure it becomes increasingly difficult to order
questions in such a manner that one measure does not influence another (particularly
implicit measures which might inadvertently prime democratic values or be influenced
by explicit measures; see Schwarz, Strack, & Mai 1991; and Schwarz & Hippler, 1995 for
a discussion of contrast and assimilation effects resulting from question order).
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Study One
Study one will measure political expertise, explicit support for democratic values,
importance of democratic norms and political tolerance, to determine whether the
relationship between expertise and tolerance is, in fact, mediated by democratic values,
importance, or the interaction between the two (see Chapter Five for additional details).
Several hypotheses pertaining to these variables will be examined in this study. Direct
effects of expertise on political tolerance, democratic values importance, and explicit
support for democratic values are anticipated in this study. Additionally, explicit support
is expected to significantly predict political tolerance, and democratic values importance
is expected to significantly predict political tolerance. In terms of simple (i.e.
nonmoderated) mediational effects, it is expected that the effect of expertise on
tolerance will be diminished when the effect of explicit democratic values on tolerance
is taken into account. Similarly, mediation of the expertise-tolerance effect by
democratic values importance will be examined (see Chapter Five for full list of
hypotheses in study one).
In addition to these simple mediational models, several moderated mediational
pathways will be tested in this study. One moderated mediational model will test
whether the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated by explicit democratic values
support, and whether this mediational pathway is moderated by importance of
democratic values. Note, here, that importance of democratic values could conceivably
moderate two possible relationships in this model: it might moderate the path from
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expertise (the IV) to explicit support (the mediator), it might moderate the path from
explicit support (the mediator) to political tolerance, or it might moderate both (see
Appendix A for a discussion of the statistical difference). All these possibilities will be
examined in this study.
Another moderated mediational model will be examined in this study, testing
whether importance of democratic values serves as a mediator of the expertisetolerance relationship, and whether such mediational pathway is moderated by explicit
democratic values support. Again, explicit democratic values support could moderate
the mediational pathway in multiple ways: first, it might moderate the relationship
between expertise (the IV) and importance (the mediator), it might moderate the path
from importance (the mediator) to political tolerance (the DV), or it might moderate
both. All three possibilities will be examined in this study as well.
Study Two
Study two will measure expertise, explicit democratic values support, and
political tolerance using the same methods as study one, but will first examine
participants’ democratic value accessibility to determine whether the link between
expertise and tolerance is mediated by how inclined participants are to consider
democratic values without prompting (see Chapter Six for details). Because the novel
construct of interest in this study is how readily participants think of democratic values
without external prompting, the measurement of accessibility will be implicit. In
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addition, the interaction between explicit support for democratic values and the
accessibility of democratic values will also be examined as a mediator.
Direct effects of expertise on political tolerance, democratic value accessibility,
and explicit support for democratic values are anticipated. In addition, explicit support is
expected to significantly predict political tolerance and democratic value accessibility as
well. Democratic value accessibility is expected to also significantly predict political
tolerance. In terms of simple (i.e. nonmoderated) mediational effects, it is expected
that the effect of expertise on tolerance will be diminished when the effect of explicit
democratic values on tolerance is taken into account. Similarly, mediation of the
expertise-tolerance effect by democratic value accessibility will be examined (see
Chapter Six for full list of hypotheses in study two).
In addition to these simple mediational models, several moderated mediational
pathways will be tested in this study. One moderated mediational model that will be
examined will test whether the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated by explicit
democratic values support, and whether this mediational pathway is moderated by
accessibility of democratic values. Note, here, that accessibility of democratic values
could conceivably moderate two possible relationships in this model: it might moderate
the path from expertise (the IV) to explicit support (the mediator), it might moderate
the path from explicit support (the mediator) to political tolerance, or it might moderate
both (see Appendix A for a discussion of the statistical difference). All these possibilities
will be examined in this study.
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Another moderated mediational model will examine whether accessibility of
democratic values serves as a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship, and
whether this mediational pathway is moderated by explicit democratic values support.
Again, explicit democratic values support could moderate the mediational pathway in
multiple ways: first, it might moderate the relationship between expertise (the IV) and
accessibility (the mediator), it might moderate the path from accessibility (the mediator)
to political tolerance (the DV), or it might moderate both. All three possibilities will be
examined in this study as well.
Study Three
Study three will measure expertise and political tolerance in the same fashion as
studies one and two, and will measure democratic value accessibility in the same
fashion as study two, but will additionally examine participants’ implicit support for
democratic norms by measuring the degree to which they implicitly associate
democratic values with positive targets.
In this study, direct effects of expertise on political tolerance, democratic value
accessibility, and implicit support for democratic values are anticipated; additionally,
implicit support is expected to significantly predict political tolerance and democratic
value accessibility as well. Democratic value accessibility is expected to also significantly
predict political tolerance. In terms of simple (i.e. nonmoderated) mediational effects, it
is expected that the effect of expertise on tolerance will be diminished when the effect
of implicit democratic values on tolerance is taken into account. Similarly, mediation of
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the expertise-tolerance effect by democratic value accessibility will be examined (see
Chapter Six for full list of hypotheses in study two).
In addition to these simple mediational models, several moderated mediational
pathways will be tested. One moderated mediational model that will examine whether
the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated by implicit democratic values support,
and whether this mediational pathway is moderated by the accessibility of democratic
values. Note, here, that accessibility of democratic values could moderate the path from
expertise (the IV) to implicit support (the mediator). Alternatively, it might moderate the
path from implicit support (the mediator) to political tolerance, or both (see Appendix A
for a discussion of the statistical difference). All these possibilities will be examined in
this study.
Another moderated mediational model will be examined in this study, testing
whether accessibility of democratic values serves as a mediator of the expertisetolerance relationship, and whether such mediational pathway is moderated by implicit
democratic values support. Again, implicit democratic values support could moderate
the mediational pathway in multiple ways: first, it might moderate the path from
expertise (the IV) and accessibility (the mediator), the path from accessibility (the
mediator) to political tolerance (the DV), or both. All three possibilities will be examined
in this study as well.

CHAPTER THREE
GENERAL METHODS
Overview
In each of the three present studies, political expertise, political tolerance,
participant demographics (such as age, education, and gender) and control variables
(such as political ideology and party) were measured using the same survey items. Each
study also included the measurement of at least two of the four potential mediators of
the expertise-tolerance relationship: explicit support for democratic values, accessibility
of democratic values, implicit support for democratic values, and importance of
democratic values, respectively. Below is a general overview of the participants utilized,
the measured predictor variables, the measured control variables and demographics,
and the measured dependent variables that are common across all studies. Deviations
from this are noted below (under each individual study’s heading).
Participants
Participants were drawn from a convenience sample of United States citizens of
legal voting age recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk). Participants were
recruited to participate in a study on their “political attitudes” that was advertised as
lasting less than thirty minutes in duration, and for which they received payment of USD
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$0.50. Participation was limited to English-fluent US citizens with internet protocol
addresses (IP addresses) that identify them as currently residing in the US; these
restrictions will be imposed using Mechanical Turk’s enrollment rules. Upon enrolling in
the study via mTurk, participants’ responses were collected using the
web-based survey software SNAP (for general survey questions) and WINTERAMIAT (for
IAT results in study three; Allon, 2013).
Materials: Predictor Variables
Political expertise. Participants’ political expertise was measured using DelliCarpini and Keeter’s (1993) recommended short form measure of political expertise.
Expertise was assessed after tolerance and the proposed mediator for each study, as it
was unlikely that the measurement of either construct would influence how much a
participant knows about politics, whereas answering a potentially challenging political
knowledge questionnaire could influence participants’ responses to questions
pertaining to tolerance and democratic values (for example, by leading participants who
perform poorly on the expertise measure to be less certain of their views).Participants
were asked, in an open-ended format, to identify the political party currently controlling
the House of Representatives at the time of data collection, to name the branch of
government responsible for determining the constitutionality of a law, who the current
Vice President is, which party is most conservative, and what congressional majority is
needed to override a Presidential veto. In addition, participants were provided with ten
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multiple-choice questions, each asking for the identification of a political figure in terms
of their current role (e.g., participants would be provided with the name Nancy Pelosi
and were asked to select her current political office held from five possible multiplechoice options). These ten items were scored as either correct or incorrect, and then
totaled into a single political expertise score.
Materials: Dependent variables
In all three studies, participants’ political tolerance was recorded using Sullivan,
Piereson, and Marcus’ (1982) content-controlled measure of tolerance.
Sullivan, Pierson & Marcus (1982). For the Sullivan et al measure of tolerance,
participants were asked to select their least-liked group in politics from a list provided
by the experimenter. Possible groups included the Ku Klux Klan, Pro-Abortionists, AntiAbortionists, Occupy Wall Street Protestors, Tea Party Members, Fascists, Communists,
Islamic Fundamentalists, and Atheists (note: some of the groups listed are from Sullivan
et al’s original measure, whereas others are more current political groups added by the
experimenter). Participants also had the option of naming a group not provided by the
experimenter. After selecting a “least-liked” group, participants were provided with a
series of statements pertaining to the civil liberties of their target group (e.g. “Members
of the ____ should be banned from being president of the United States.”; Members
of the ____ should be allowed to teach in the public schools.”) and were asked to
provide their agreement or disagreement with each statement on a 1-7 scale (ranging
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”). Responses to each of the scale items were
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normalized and averaged to calculate a participants’ least-liked procedure tolerance
score.
Materials: Control Measures
Participants were asked to report their political ideology on a seven-point scale
ranging from 1 (extremely conservative) to 7 (extremely liberal) with a midpoint of
"moderate”. Participants were also asked to report their party identification on an
ordinal scale with the following options: Strong Democrat, Moderate Democrat,
Independent, Moderate Republican, and Strong Democrat. Participants were asked
about their attitude toward their selected least-liked group, using a seven-point scale
ranging from “Strongly Dislike” to “Strongly Like”. Participants were asked to report
their age, gender, highest level of education, and region of the country, each being
assessed by a single question with multiple-choice responses. Participants were asked to
report their past political participation by selecting political activities they have
performed in the past from a checklist, (“Have you engaged in any of the following
political activities? Please check all that apply.”); the checklist included donating to
political campaigns, volunteering for past political campaigns, voting in Presidential
elections, voting in non-Presidential elections, wearing political buttons, displaying
political bumper stickers or yard signs, and donating to political candidates. All control
measures will be collected at the end of each respective study.
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Procedure
Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (with the
exception of study three; see below). On mTurk, the studies were advertised as surveys
on “Americans’ Political Opinions” and study had an advertised length of less than thirty
minutes, with a pay of $0.50. Upon agreeing to participate and “accepting” the study
advertisement on mTurk, participants were directed to a survey link on SNAP. The
survey on SNAP informed participants of their rights and obtain anonymous consent.
Following informed consent, participants were assessed for the democratic value
accessibility (in studies 2 and 3), then directed to a page that asked for their least-liked
group in politics; participants’ least-liked group were fed into the stems of the Sullivan
et al (1982) tolerance questions, which participants then answered. Following these
questions, participants were asked about their explicit support for democratic values (in
studies 1 and 2), their implicit support for democratic values (in study three), and their
subjective importance of democratic values (in study one) (see below for greater detail
on measures and question order for each specific study). Participants then reported
their political expertise. Following these key variables, participants were asked to report
their political ideology, political party, and their demographics. Upon completing the
survey participants were debriefed and assigned payment via mTurk.
Proposed Statistical Treatment
Multiple regression was used to analyze the data from the present studies.
Continuous predictor variables (e.g., political expertise, explicit democratic values
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support, etc) were centered (by subtracting participant's scores on each scale from the
sample mean). These predictors were then entered into a regression equation. For each
study, hypothesized main effects of predictors on tolerance were interpreted by
examining effects for that predictor. To test mediation, Baron and Kenney’s (1986) fourstep procedure was used (see the following Chapters for study-specific hypotheses and
details). To test moderated mediation when at least one predictor is not correlated with
expertise, Muller et al’s (2005) procedure was used, employing Preacher et al’s (2007)
MODMED macro (see Appendix B for details). To test moderated mediation in cases
where both predictor variables (mediator and moderator) were correlated with
expertise, Preacher et al’s (2007) was also used, employing a slightly distinct model in
MODMED (see below for details).

CHAPTER FOUR
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
Reliability Analyses
Composite scores were created for all multi-item measures, including political
tolerance, political expertise, explicit support for democratic values, importance of
democratic values, implicit support for democratic values, and accessibility of
democratic values. Reliability analyses were performed to determine how best to create
these composite scores. All twenty tolerance items were highly internally reliable upon
initial analysis (α=.771 for study one, α=.945 for study two, α=.946 for study three), and
so all twenty items were included in participants’ composite political tolerance score
across all three studies. Political expertise was highly internally reliable across all studies
(α=.751 for Study one, α=.780 for study two, α=.768 for study three) and all items were
therefore retained for participants’ composite score. Democratic values importance was
highly internally reliable across both studies in which it was recorded (α=.913 for study
one, α=.751 for study two). Explicit support for democratic values was highly reliable
across both studies in which it was recorded (α=.777 in study one, α=.743 for study
two). Accessibility of democratic values was reliable across both studies in which it was
recorded (α=.860 in study two, α=.659 in study three). Implicit support of democratic
values was highly reliable in the study in which it was recorded (α=.707 in study three).
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Due to this consistent high reliability, all composite scales were kept intact across all
three studies and analyzed accordingly.
Bivariate Relations Between Variables
Due to the considerable overlap in variables analyzed in study one, two, and
three, it was considered prudent to first examine the bivariate relations between
variables in all three studies before selecting appropriate control variables to be used
across studies. This allowed for the selection of control variables to be consistent across
all three studies and all three sets of analyses. Accordingly, the bivariate relationships
between variables in all three studies will be described below, and possible control
variables will be discussed before the results of the individual studies are explored.
Study One
Preliminary analyses were performed to examine the relation between the
various continuous predictor variables- political expertise, explicit support of democratic
values, and importance of democratic values (as well as the potential control variables,
such as political ideology, political party, education, and age; see Table 1). Political
expertise was significantly positively correlated with explicit democratic values support
(r=.270, r²=.07, p<.001), positively correlated with political participation (r=.344, r²=.118,
p<.001), positively correlated with education (r=.401, r²=.16, p<.001), and positively
correlated with age (r=.358, r²=.13, p<.001. Explicit support for democratic values was
significantly positively correlated with political participation (r=.156, r²=.02, p<.013), and
education(r=.216, r²=.05, p<.001). Importance of democratic values was significantly
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positively correlated with age (r= .131, r²=.02, p<.041). Education was significantly
positively correlated with participation (r=.180, r²=.03, p<.040). Not surprisingly, political
ideology and political party were strongly positively correlated (r=.794, r²=.63, p<.001),
such that more conservative ideologies were associated with a more Republican party
identification (and likewise for liberal ideology and Democratic party identification).
Political ideology was also positively correlated with age (r=.133, r²=.02, p<.035), with
more conservative ideological placement being associated with greater age. Correlation
results therefore confirm that explicit support, importance, and expertise are correlated
but conceptually distinct constructs.
The bivariate relations between predictor variables and political tolerance were
also examined (see Table 1). Political tolerance was significantly positively correlated
with political expertise (r=.167, r²=.03, p<.009). Tolerance was also strongly positively
correlated with explicit democratic values support (r=.216, r²=.05, p<.001), political
participation (r=.344, r²=.12, p<.001), and education (r=.401, r²=.16, p<.001). Note that
political ideology and political party, despite being variables of massive import in
political psychology, were only correlated with one another (r=.794, r²=.63 p<.001) and
not with political tolerance. This is typical for the political tolerance literature, and is
consistent with past research using the least-liked measurement procedure,
demonstrating no direct link between political ideology and political tolerance (Sullivan
et al, 1981). Note also that political tolerance was not correlated with importance of
democratic values in this study(r=.046, r²=.002, p=.484).

45

Study Two
Preliminary analyses were performed to examine the relation between the
various continuous predictor variables- political expertise, explicit support of democratic
values, and importance of democratic values (as well as the potential control variables,
such as political ideology, political party, education, and age; see Table 2). Political
expertise was significantly positively correlated with explicit democratic values support
(r= .291, r²= .08, p<.001), positively correlated with democratic value accessibility (r=
.292, r²= .09, p<.001) positively correlated with political participation (r=.383, r²=.146,
p<.001), positively correlated with education (r= .366, r²=.134, p<.001), and positively
correlated with age (r= .246, r²=.06, p<.001. Explicit support for democratic values was
significantly positively correlated with democratic value accessibility (r= .170, r²=.03,
p<.007), positively correlated with participation (r=.193, r²=.04, p<.002), negatively
correlated with political party (r=-.163, r²=.04, p<.009), and negatively correlated with
political ideology (r= -.204, r²=.04, p<.001). Education was significantly positively
correlated with participation (r= .325, r²=.11, p<.001) and age (r= .217, r²=.05, p<.001).
Not surprisingly, political ideology and political party were strongly positively correlated
(r= .751, r²=.56, p<.001), such that more conservative ideologies were associated with a
more Republican party identification (and likewise for liberal ideology and Democratic
party identification). Political ideology was also positively correlated with age (r= .148,
r²=.01, p<.018), with more conservative ideological placement being associated with
greater age, and with participation (r= -.132, r²=.02, p<.036), with less participation
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being associated with a more conservative ideology. Correlation results thus have
confirmed that explicit support, accessibility, and expertise are correlated but
conceptually distinct constructs.
The bivariate relations between predictor variables and political tolerance were
also examined (see Table 2). Political tolerance was significantly positively correlated
with political expertise (r= .372, r²=.14, p<.001). Tolerance was also strongly positively
correlated with explicit democratic values support (r= .618, r²=.38, p<.001), democratic
value accessibility (r= .137, r²= .02, p<.029), education (r= .249, r²= .06, p<.001), and
participation (r= .252, r²= .06, p<.001). Note that political ideology and political party,
despite being variables of massive import in political psychology, were only correlated
with one another (r=.751, r²=.56 p<.001) and not with political tolerance. This is
consistent with past research demonstrating no direct link between political ideology
and political tolerance (Sullivan et al, 1981), as well as with the results of study one.
Study Three
Preliminary analyses were performed to examine the relation between the
various continuous predictor variables- political expertise, explicit support of democratic
values, and importance of democratic values (as well as the potential control variables,
such as political ideology, political party, education, and age; see Table 3). Political
expertise was significantly positively correlated with implicit democratic values support
(r= .305, r²= .09, p<.001), positively correlated with political participation (r=.440,
r²=.194, p<.001), positively correlated with education (r= .268, r²=.072, p<.001), and
positively correlated with age (r= .365, r²=.133, p<.001), and was negatively correlated
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with attitude toward least liked group (r=-.247, r²=.061, p<.001) . Implicit support for
democratic values was significantly positively correlated with age (r= .244, r²=.059,
p<.001), positively correlated with participation (r=.250, r²=.063, p<.001), negatively
correlated with political ideology (r=-.144, r²=.02, p<.022, indicating that conservatism
was associated with lower implicit support), and negatively correlated with attitude
toward least liked group (r=-.184, r²=033, p<.01). Democratic value accessibility was
significantly positively correlated with ideology (r= .151, r²=.022, p<.017; conservatism
was associated with greater democratic value accessibility). Education was positively
correlated with participation (r= .323, r²=.104, p<.001), age (r= .172, r²=.029, p<.006)
and negatively correlated with attitude toward least liked group (r=-.129, r²=.016, p<.04)
and political party (r= -.132, r²=.017, p<.037; Republican identification was associated
with lower education). Participation was also negatively correlated with attitude toward
least liked group (r=-.249, r²=.062, p<.001). Not surprisingly, political ideology and
political party were strongly positively correlated (r= .774, r²=.599, p<.001), such that
more conservative ideologies were associated with a more Republican Party
identification (and likewise for liberal ideology and Democratic Party identification).
Political party was also negatively correlated with participation (r= -.132, r²=.017,
p<.037), with less participation being associated with a more conservative ideology.
Correlation results therefore confirm that accessibility, implicit support, and expertise
are correlated but conceptually distinct constructs.
The bivariate relations between predictor variables and political tolerance were
also examined (see Table 3). Political tolerance was significantly positively correlated
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with political expertise (r= .261, r²=.068, p<.001). Tolerance was also positively
correlated with implicit democratic values support (r= .138, r²=.019, p<.029), democratic
value accessibility (r= .135, r²= .018, p<.032), education (r= .170, r²= .028, p<.007), and
participation (r= .287, r²= .082, p<.001). Political ideology was significantly negatively
correlated with tolerance in this study (r= -.182, r²=.033, p<.004), in sharp contrast with
the prior two studies and with most prior research on political tolerance.
Potential Control Variables
In light of these preliminary results, three variables emerged as potential
controls, due to their significant correlations with political tolerance in at least one of
three studies: Education, Political Participation, and Ideology. For various reasons, these
variables are not always appropriate controls for inclusion in all analyses across all
studies: ideology is only correlated with tolerance in one study (study three), and is
therefore not appropriate as a control variable in studies one and two. As for education
and participation, which are correlated with political tolerance, these constructs are also
possible antecedents to political expertise, and therefore controlling for these variables
might, in essence, control for the effect of one of the key variables in this study.
However, it should be noted in advance that all analyses in these studies were,
nonetheless, run both with and without controls, and inclusion of education,
participation, age, and ideology made no difference in the results of any analysis (see
appendix C for analyses with controls). The rationale for excluding these variables from
the main analyses, however, follows.
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Education
Education was found to be a significant correlate of tolerance in all three studies
(see Tables 1, 2, and 3). Education was also, however, a strong positive correlate of
political expertise. This is consistent with extant political tolerance research and theory,
which holds that education, particularly civics education, is a large contributor to both
political knowledge and political tolerance (Stouffer, 1955; Prothro & Grigg, 1960;
Jackman, 1972; Nunn et al, 1978; Bobo & Licari, 1989; see Chapter One of this
dissertation). It is therefore unwise, when political expertise is the key predictor of
interest, to control for effects of an antecedent to political expertise. Future research
should examine the relationship between education, civics education, political
knowledge, and tolerance, but since such questions are outside the purview of the
present dissertation, it will not be discussed at length in this text (see Discussion
Chapter of this dissertation). Education was therefore not used as a control variable in
main analyses. However, all analyses were replicated with education included as a
control, and there was no significant difference in any of the results (see Appendix C).
Participation
Participation was found to be a significant correlate of tolerance in all three
studies. However, the pitfalls of controlling for the effects of participation are similar to
the pitfalls of controlling for education; namely, it has long been theorized that taking
part in politics makes a person more informed about the political landscape, and more
familiar with (and tolerant of) opposing views as a result (McClosky, 1964; McClosky &
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Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Stouffer, 1955; see Chapter One
of this dissertation). Participation, is of course, also strongly correlated with political
expertise in these studies and in much of the political tolerance literature. Accordingly,
it was decided that political participation should not be included as a control variable in
the main analyses. Nonetheless, all analyses were replicated with participation included
as a control, as was the case with education, and it had no impact on the pattern or
significance of results (see Appendix C for analyses with controls).
Ideology
In study three, participants’ political ideology was found to be correlated with
political tolerance, such that more liberal attitudes were associated with greater
tolerance. This was inconsistent with the other two studies, which indicated there was
no relationship between political tolerance and ideology. This result is also in sharp
contrast with the prevailing findings in the political tolerance literature, particularly
ones employing the least-liked measurement method; political ideology and party are
typically found to be unrelated to political tolerance when respondents are allowed to
select their own target group (see, e.g. Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Jackman, 1972; Sullivan
et al, 1982; Shamir & Sullivan, 1983; Price & Ottati, 2012). Due to the fact that ideology
is not typically related to tolerance, and due to the fact that it was not correlated with
tolerance in the majority of these three studies, ideology was generally not explored as
a control variable in the main analyses. Ideology was, however, included as a control
when replicating analyses in study three, and had no impact on the pattern or
significance of results (see Appendix C).

CHAPTER FIVE
STUDY ONE
Overview
In this first study, political tolerance was measured as the chief dependent
variable of interest, and political expertise, explicit democratic values support, and
democratic values importance were assessed as predictors. In addition, potential
control variables such as education, participation, political ideology, and political party
were assessed (see Chapter Four for details). This study was primarily concerned with
examining effects of expertise, explicit democratic values, and democratic values
importance on tolerance, respectively, as well as examining effects of expertise on
importance and explicit support (see Hypotheses below). Additionally, mediation of the
expertise-tolerance relationship by explicit support and importance, respectively, were
examined. Moderated forms of these two mediational pathways were also tested (see
below for specific hypotheses).
Hypotheses
H1: In a direct replication of numerous previous studies, expertise will be a
strong positive predictor of tolerance.
H2: In direct replication of numerous studies, support for democratic values will
predict tolerance.
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H3: Expertise will predict explicit support for democratic values.
H4: Expertise will predict importance of democratic values.
H5: Importance of democratic values will predict tolerance.
H6: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by
support for democratic values.
H7: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by
importance of democratic values.
H8: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by
importance of democratic values, when controlling for explicit support.
H9: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by
support for democratic values, when controlling for importance.
H10: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit support for
democratic values for high importance participants. However, the effect of expertise on
tolerance is not mediated by democratic values for low importance participants. This
hypothesis presumes that importance of democratic values and expertise are not
correlated, as per Muller et al’s (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation (see
Proposed Statistical Treatment, below for detail).
H11: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by importance for high
support explicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is
not mediated by importance for low explicit support participants. This hypothesis
presumes that support for democratic values and expertise are not correlated, as per
Muller et al’s (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation.
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H12: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by importance for high
explicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not
mediated by importance for low explicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes
that support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and importance and
expertise are correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure to be tested
(Preacher et al, 2007).
H13: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit support for high
importance participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated
by explicit support for low importance participants. This hypothesis presumes that
support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and importance and
expertise are correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure to be tested that
the related hypothesis, above (Preacher et al, 2007).
Methods
Proposed Mediators: Explicit Support for Democratic Values and Importance of
Democratic Values
In study one, participants’ explicit support for democratic norms was assessed
(using multiple measures from both Sullivan et al, 1995 and the World Values Survey) as
a predictor of political tolerance, as well as importance of democratic values. Explicit
support for democratic norms and importance were measured after political tolerance,
as inquiring about participants’ support for democratic norms prior to the tolerance
questionnaire might increase the salience of such values and could influence tolerance
judgments as a result (note, however, that related research has used either question
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order with no apparent effect; Stouffer, 1955; Sniderman, 1975; Peffley et al, 2001.)
Out of necessity, and in accordance with most studies of attitude importance, the
importance of democratic values was recorded after explicit support (Krosnick, 1988).
Support for democratic norms. Participants’ explicit support for democratic
norms was recorded using Sullivan et al’s (1985) Support for the Norms of Democracy
Scale. This scale has been used to study support for democratic values in both the
United States and developing former member states of the Soviet Union (Gibson et al,
1992) and has been consistently validated as a measure of participants’ attitudes
toward democratic ideals. The scale consists of four statements regarding the normative
value of equal protection under the law (e.g. “No matter what a person’s political beliefs
are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else.”), two of
which are reverse-scored (e.g. “When the country is in great danger we may have to
force people to testify against themselves even if this violates their civil rights. “). In the
present study, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with these
statements by selecting values on a 1-7 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree” (note: some early versions of this survey only provided three response
options: agree, disagree, and don’t know, but for the sake of increasing variation in
responses the present study will use a 1-7 scale).
Democratic values importance. Following each item in the democratic values
support scales, participants were asked how important their attitude is to them (“For
the above question, how important is this attitude to you?”), selecting an option from a
1 to 7 scale (ranging from “not at all important” to “very important”; (Krosnick, 1988).
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Results
Participant Demographics
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 72 years (M=32.60, SD=11.535). Most
participants reported a college degree as their highest level of education (M=4.24,
SD=1.688). Fifty-eight percent of participants were male (N=146) and forty-one percent
were female (N=105). All participants were American citizens (N=251) and ninety-four
percent of participants reported English as their first language (N=237). Participants
were moderate in their level of political participation (M=2.41, SD=1.455). The most
least-liked groups most frequently chosen by participants were: the Ku Klux Klan
(48.8%), Islamic Fundamentalists (14.2%), Tea Party Protesters (7.4%), Fascists (7.6%),
Communists (4.8%), Anti-Abortionists (5.6%), and Pro-Abortionists (2.4%).
Study One Main Analyses
Three sets of analyses were performed. First, linear regression analyses were
performed to test hypotheses 1-5, pertaining to simple (i.e. nonmediated) prediction by
continuous variables. Second, hypotheses 6-9 were tested using mediation analyses in
regression, following Baron and Kenney’s (1986) four-step procedure. Lastly,
hypotheses 10-13 were tested using moderated mediational analyses, employing the
bootstrapping procedure and MODMED SPSS macro created by Preacher et al (2007). In
all cases, effects reported are from analyses without controls, but have been replicated
with controls (see Appendix C for these analyses).
Hypotheses 1-5: simple linear regression analyses. The effect of political
expertise on tolerance (hypothesis 1) was tested using linear regression. Expertise was
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centered and entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses
revealed, consistent with hypothesis one, that political expertise was indeed a
significant predictor of political tolerance (B=.147, β=.167 SE=.056 p<.009; see Table 4).
The effect of explicit support for democratic values on tolerance (hypothesis 2)
was tested using linear regression. Explicit democratic values support was centered an
entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses revealed that explicit
democratic values support was indeed a significant predictor of tolerance (B=.191,
β=.216 SE=.055 p<.001; see Table 5).
The effect of democratic values importance on tolerance was tested by centering
importance and entering it as a predictor at step 1. Regression analyses indicated that
democratic values importance was, in fact, a significant predictor of tolerance (B =.158,
β=.181, SE=.055, p<.004, see Table 6).
In addition, expertise was examined as a predictor of explicit democratic values
support (hypothesis 3). Regression analyses revealed that expertise did significantly
predict explicit support for democratic values, (B =.272, β=.270, SE=.062, p<.001, see
Table 7).
Expertise was also examined as a predictor of democratic values importance
(hypothesis 4). Regression analyses revealed that political expertise was not a significant
predictor of importance of democratic values (B=.087, β=.046 SE=.124 p<.484, see Table
8).
Hypotheses 6-9: non-moderated mediation. Mediation of the expertisetolerance relationship by explicit democratic values support (hypothesis 6) was tested
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using Baron and Kenney’s (1986) four step procedure. First, an as discussed above, a
significant effect of expertise on tolerance was documented (B= .147, β= .167 SE= .056
p<.009). Second, and also as described above, the effect of expertise on the mediator,
explicit support of democratic values, was confirmed (B =.272, β=.270, SE=.062, p<.001).
Third, the effect of the mediator (explicit democratic values support) on tolerance was
tested and found to be significant (B= .165, β= .188 SE= .057 p<.004). Finally, the fourth
condition for mediation was tested: controlling for explicit democratic values support
(mediator) reduced the effect of expertise on tolerance (Sobel, 1982, using Preacher
and Leonardelli’s 2010 calculator; Z=-2.416; SE= .019; p< .01; see Figure 1). Thus,
explicit democratic values support partially mediated the relationship between
expertise and tolerance.
The above mediational analyses were also reproduced when controlling for
importance of democratic values, as per hypothesis 8. As before, a significant effect of
expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using regression (B =.137, β=.143, SE=.055,
p<.010), meeting the first necessary criterion for establishing mediation. Second, the
effect of expertise on the mediator, explicit democratic values support, was also
demonstrated when controlling for importance (B =.242, β=.265, SE=.062, p<.001).
Third, the effect of explicit democratic values support on tolerance was again tested and
established (B =.225, β=.219, SE=.062, p<.001). Finally, the fourth condition for
mediation was tested: controlling for explicit democratic values support (mediator)
reduced the effect of expertise on tolerance (Sobel, 1982, using Preacher and
Leonardelli’s 2010 calculator; Z= -2.637; SE = .019; p< .008; see Figure 2). Thus, explicit
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democratic values support partially mediated the relationship between expertise and
tolerance, when controlling for democratic values importance.
Next, mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by importance of
democratic values was tested (hypothesis 7). As before, a significant effect of expertise
on tolerance was demonstrated using regression analyses, meeting the first criterion for
establishing mediation (B =.137, β=.143, SE=.055, p<.010) Second, the effect of expertise
on the mediator, importance of democratic values, was tested; however, expertise was
not found to be a significant predictor of importance (B =.045, β=.046, SE=.064, p=.484).
Thus, the second criterion for establishing mediation was not met, and as per Sobel’s
(1982; see also Preacher & Leonardelli, 2010) procedure, the test concluded with no
evidence of mediation by importance.
Following this mediational test, mediation by importance while controlling for
explicit support was tested (in accordance with hypothesis 9). This time, the first
criterion for establishing mediation was not met, as there was no significant effect of
expertise on tolerance while controlling for explicit democratic values support (B =.103,
β=.116, SE=.057, p<.074). However, since this effect was marginally significant, analyses
proceeded to criterion two of establishing mediation. However, as above, there was no
significant effect of expertise on the proposed mediator, importance, when controlling
for explicit support (B =-.026, β=-.026, SE=.067, p=.701). Thus, the criteria for
establishing mediation by importance were not met and analyses concluded.
Hypotheses 10-13: moderated mediation. First, hypothesis 10 and 12 were
tested, which posited that the effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit
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support, but that this mediational path is itself moderated by democratic values
importance. Analyses of these models followed Preacher et al’s (2007) procedure and
utilized the authors’ (2007) moderated mediation testing macro for SPSS, MODMED.
According to Preacher et al (2007), Muller et al (2005), and MacKinnon (2008),
there is evidence of moderated mediation if a) the effect of the IV on the DV is
significant; b) there is a significant effect of the mediator on the DV; and if either (or
both) of the following are met: c) there is a significant interaction between the IV and
the moderator in predicting the mediator ; or d) there is a significant interaction
between the moderator and the mediator predicting the DV. Once these prerequisites
are met, the mediational model is estimated by MODMED at high (+1 SD) and low (-1
SD) levels of the moderator, as well as when the moderator is at the mean, and the
indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, for each level of the moderator is examined
(see below for a description of how to interpret the indirect effect).
MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of
the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already demonstrated above (B =.137,
β=.143, SE=.055, p<.010). Second, there was a significant effect of the mediator (explicit
democratic values support) on the DV (B =.2187, SE=.056, p<.001; see Table 10). There
was not a significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator
(importance) predicting the mediator (explicit support) (B =-.009, SE=.063, p=.882; see
Table 9), though note that this interaction was not predicted by hypothesis 10 (see
Figure 3). However, there was a significant interaction between the mediator (explicit
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support) and the moderator (importance) predicting the DV (B =-.1914, SE=.061,
p<.002).
Given that the criteria for establishing moderated mediation were successfully
met, the mediational model was then estimated for both high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD)
levels of the moderator (importance), using Preacher et al’s (2007) MODMED macro for
SPSS (see Table 11 for these estimated indirect effects). It should be noted, however,
that when testing moderated mediation and estimating the mediational model at high
and low levels of the moderator, the key score of interest (provided using MODMED
analyses) is the indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, at both levels of the DV. To
those more familiar with simple mediational testing via the Sobel’s test, this should be
clarified: the indirect effect reflects the extent of the reduction of the IV’s ability to
predict the DV when the mediator’s effect on the DV is accounted for (for a given level
of the moderator). In other words, a high, significant indirect effect score is a sign of a
mediational model that is successful and accounts for a great deal of the IV’s effect on
the DV. This is a direct inversion of what is typically observed in a simple mediational
test, and which is tested by a Sobel’s test: whereas in simple mediation, it is typical to
look at the IV’s ability to predict the DV by itself, and then look to see if the IV’s ability to
predict the DV is diminished when the mediator is included in analyses (and thus a low
coefficient in the final model is a sign of mediation), MODMED simply reports the
indirect effect of the IV on the DV, via the mediator, and thus indicates the size of the
reduction itself (and thus a high score is an indication of mediation).
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Analyses revealed that explicit support for democratic values did not
significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when
importance was low (-1 standard deviation below the mean; B =-.008, SE=.022; Z=-.388;
p>.69; see Table 11). However, explicit support for democratic values did significantly
mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when importance of
democratic values was high (+1 standard deviation above the mean B =-.104, SE=.046;
Z=-2.26, p<.02). Thus, the mediational pathway tested (and supported) in hypotheses 6
and 9 was found to be moderated by importance, in accordance with hypothesis 10,
though not hypothesis 12 (see Tables 9, 10, and 11).
Next, hypotheses 11 and 13 were tested. These hypotheses proposed a
moderated mediational model where the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated
by democratic values importance, but that this indirect effect is moderated by explicit
democratic values support. MODMED analyses revealed, first, that in the full model
predicting the DV, expertise no longer remained a significant predictor (B =.091, β=.062,
SE=.054, p=.095; see Table 12). This criteria for establishing moderated mediation being
unmet, testing of the full model was discontinued.
Study One Discussion
Study one examined thirteen main hypotheses. As anticipated, expertise was
found to be a significant and strong predictor of political tolerance. Expertise was also
revealed to be a significant predictor of explicit democratic values support, as
anticipated, though it was not found to significantly predict democratic values
importance. Explicit democratic values was found to significantly predict tolerance, and
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importance of democratic values was found to significantly predict tolerance as well.
All these effects are largely consistent with what was hypothesized (except for the lack
of an effect of expertise on importance), and demonstrates that these predictors are
related but distinct constructs, all of which contribute to an individual’s level of political
tolerance. Bivariate correlational analyses revealed that these predictors were all
related, but distinct constructs.
In addition, it was found that explicit democratic values significantly mediated
the relationship between expertise and tolerance. In other words, when accounting for
the effect of explicit democratic values support on tolerance, the effect of expertise on
tolerance was significantly diminished. This indicates that the effect of explicit support
on tolerance partially accounts for the expertise-tolerance relationship, as hypothesized.
Experts are, in part, more tolerant than political novices because they have higher
explicit support for democratic norms such as freedom and equality under the law. This
mediational path remained significant when democratic values importance was
controlled for, as well.
Mediation by importance of democratic values, however, was not established.
This was due to the fact that expertise did not have a significant effect on democratic
values importance, precluding the possibility of mediation. This suggests that the
expertise does not increase tolerance because it leads to greater subjective importance
of democratic values, but simply by increasing explicit support for those values.
While one of the two main moderated mediational models was unsupported in
this study, there was evidence for mediation by explicit support and mediation by
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importance, as hypothesized. Specifically, it was found that when importance of
democratic values was high, explicit democratic values support did mediate the
relationship between expertise and tolerance. However, when democratic values
importance was low, mediation by explicit support was no longer evident. This suggests
that among individuals high in their subjective weighing of democratic values as an
important and critical value worthy of consideration, part of the link between expertise
and tolerance is accounted for by their explicit support of that value. However, among
individuals who do not see democratic values as a critical and important value, the link
between expertise and tolerance is not well accounted for by explicit democratic values
support. In other words, explicit support for democratic values positively influences
tolerance only when those values are seen as important. This implies that among
experts who do not rank democratic values as important, some other factor must be
contributing to their higher-than-average tolerance.

CHAPTER SIX
STUDY TWO
Overview
Study one provided some evidence that the expertise-tolerance relationship is
mediated by explicit democratic values support, and that this mediational pathway
might only occur when democratic values are seen as important. Study one also
replicated previous findings that tolerance is predicted by expertise and explicit
democratic values support, and provided new evidence that tolerance is predicted also
by democratic values importance. Study two expands upon these findings by examining
a more implicit measure, democratic value accessibility, as a predictor.
While many of the same predictors and potential controls were assessed in study
two as in study one, democratic values importance was replaced in this study by
democratic value accessibility. This construct has never been previously examined as a
predictor of tolerance in an empirical study, let alone as a possible mediator of the
expertise-tolerance effect. Participants completed a word-completion measure
assessing how inclined they were to think about democratic values (see Method section,
below, for details on this measure). In addition, political expertise, explicit democratic
values support, tolerance, and the same control variables as in study one were assessed.
This study allowed, then, for the examination of several new hypotheses pertaining to
democratic value accessibility, and also provided the opportunity to replicate study
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one’s results involving the effects of expertise and explicit democratic values support.
It was expected that democratic value accessibility would mediate the expertisetolerance relationship. Further, it was expected that democratic value accessibility
might moderate the model in which explicit support served as a mediator of the
expertise-tolerance relationship. Additionally, it was hypothesized that accessibility of
democratic values might mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance, and
that this mediational pathway might be moderated by explicit support.
Hypotheses
H14: In a direct replication of numerous previous studies, expertise will be a
strong positive predictor of tolerance.
H15: Accessibility of democratic values will predict tolerance.
H16: Explicit support of democratic values will predict tolerance.
H17: Expertise will predict accessibility of democratic values.
H18: Expertise will predict explicit support of democratic values.
H19: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by
accessibility of democratic values.
H20: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by
explicit support for democratic values.
H21: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by
accessibility of democratic values, when controlling for explicit support.
H22: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by
support for democratic values, when controlling for accessibility.

66
H23: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit support for
democratic values for high accessibility participants. However, the effect of expertise on
tolerance is not mediated by democratic values for low accessibility participants. This
hypothesis presumes that accessibility of democratic values and expertise are not
correlated, as per Muller et al’s (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation (see
Proposed Statistical Treatment, below for detail).
H24: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by accessibility for high
explicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not
mediated by accessibility for low explicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes
that explicit support for democratic values and expertise are not correlated, as per
Muller et al’s (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation.
H25: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by accessibility for high
explicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not
mediated by accessibility for low explicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes
that support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and accessibility and
expertise are correlated, and thus requires a different statistical procedure to be tested
(Preacher et al, 2007).
H26: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit support for high
accessibility participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated
by explicit support for low accessibility participants. This hypothesis presumes that
accessibility and expertise are correlated, and explicit support and expertise are

67
correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure to be tested (Preacher et al,
2007).
Methods
Proposed Mediators: Accessibility of Democratic Values and Explicit Support for
Democratic Values
In study two, the accessibility of democratic norms was assessed (using an
adapted version of Greenberg et al’s 1994 death-thought accessibility measure), and
analyzed as a predictor of political tolerance. In addition, explicit support for democratic
values was measured in the same manner as study one. Accessibility of democratic
values was measured prior to tolerance, explicit support, and expertise in this study, as
consideration of tolerance judgments (or of political knowledge in general) might
influence the salience of democratic values and increase accessibility if it were
measured afterward, whereas the desired construct is how prone participants are to
think of democratic values without such prompting. Explicit support for democratic
values was measured after tolerance has been measured, as before.
Accessibility of democratic values. The accessibility of democratic values in
participants’ minds was assessed using an adapted version of Greenberg et al’s (1994)
fill-in-the-blank accessibility test. Participants were given 26 partially-completed word
stems, which they were instructed to complete as quickly as possible. Seven of the
words fragments had several possible “correct” answers, one of which pertained to
democratic norms and values ( e.g., __ R E E, which can be completed as either “free” or
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“tree”; L __ W, which can be completed as either “law” or “low”), while the remaining
19 word fragments had neutral “correct” answers to mask the purpose of the measure.
Results
Participant Demographics
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 72 years (M=35.38, SD=13.761). Most
participants reported a college degree as their highest level of education (M=4.13,
SD=1.674). Fifty-five percent of participants were male (N=142) and forty-one percent
were female (N=113). All participants were American citizens (N=255) and ninety-six
percent of participants reported English as their first language (N=247). Participants
were moderate in their rate of political participation (M=3.85, SD=2.263). The most
popular least-liked groups chosen by participants were: the Ku Klux Klan (45.4%), Islamic
Fundamentalists (16.2%), Tea Party Protesters (7.3%), Fascists (7.6%), Communists
(4.4%), Anti-Abortionists (6.2%), and Pro-Abortionists (4%).
Study two main analyses. Three sets of analyses were performed. First, linear
regression analyses were performed to test hypotheses 14-18, pertaining to simple (i.e.
nonmediated) prediction by continuous variables. Second, hypotheses 19-22 were
tested using mediation analyses in regression, following Baron and Kenney’s (1986)
four-step procedure. Lastly, hypotheses 23-26 were tested using moderated
mediational analyses, employing the bootstrapping procedure and SPSS macro created
by Preacher et al (2007). In all cases, effects reported are from analyses without
controls, but have been replicated with controls (see Appendix C for these analyses).
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Hypotheses 1-5: simple linear regression analyses. The effect of political
expertise on tolerance (hypothesis 14) was tested using linear regression. Expertise was
centered and entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses
revealed, consistent with hypothesis one, that political expertise was indeed a
significant predictor of political tolerance (B= .561, β= .372 SE= .088 p<.001; see Table
14).
The effect of explicit support for democratic values on tolerance (hypothesis 16)
was tested using linear regression. Explicit democratic values support was centered an
entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses revealed that explicit
democratic values support was indeed a significant predictor of tolerance (B= .932, β=
.618 SE= .075 p<.0001; see Table 15).
The effect of democratic value accessibility on tolerance (hypothesis 15) was
tested by centering and entering it as a predictor at step 1. Regression analyses
indicated that democratic value accessibility was, in fact, a significant predictor of
tolerance (B =.207, β=.137, SE=.094, p<.029, see Table 16).
In addition, expertise was examined as a predictor of explicit democratic values
support (hypothesis 18). Regression analyses revealed that expertise did significantly
predict explicit support for democratic values, (B =.425, β=.323, SE=.078, p<.001, see
Table 17).
Expertise was also examined as a predictor of democratic value accessibility
(hypothesis 17). Regression analyses revealed that political expertise was a significant
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predictor of democratic value accessibility (B= .264, β= .292 SE= .054 p<.001, see
Table 18).
Hypotheses 19-22: non-moderated mediation. Mediation of the expertisetolerance relationship by explicit democratic values support (hypothesis 20) was tested
using Baron and Kenney’s (1986) four step procedure. First, and as discussed above, a
significant effect of expertise on tolerance was documented (B= .932, β= .618 SE=.075
p<.0001). Second, and also as described above, the effect of expertise on the mediator,
explicit support of democratic values, was confirmed (B =.425, β=.323, SE=.078, p<.001).
Third, the effect of the mediator (explicit democratic values support) on tolerance was
tested and found to be significant (B =.838, β=.555, SE=.077, p<.001). Finally, the fourth
condition for mediation was tested: controlling for explicit democratic values support
(the mediator) reduced the effect of expertise on tolerance (Sobel, 1982, using Preacher
and Leonardelli’s 2010 calculator; Z=4.891; SE=.055; p<001; see Figure 5). Thus, explicit
democratic values support partially mediated the relationship between expertise and
tolerance.
The above mediational analyses were also reproduced when controlling for
accessibility of democratic values, as per hypothesis 22. As before, a significant effect of
expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using regression (B =.548, β=.363, SE=.092,
p<.001), meeting the first necessary criterion for establishing mediation. Second, the
effect of expertise on the mediator, explicit democratic values support, was also
demonstrated when controlling for accessibility (B =.299, β=.299, SE=.062, p<.001).
Third, the effect of explicit democratic values support on tolerance was again tested and
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established (B =.839, β=.557, SE=.077, p<.001). Finally, the fourth condition for
mediation was tested: controlling for explicit democratic values support (the mediator)
reduced the effect of expertise on tolerance (Sobel, 1982, using Preacher and
Leonardelli’s 2010 calculator; Z=4.41; SE =.057; p <.001; see Figure 6). Thus, explicit
democratic values support partially mediated the relationship between expertise and
tolerance, when controlling for democratic value accessibility.
Next, mediation by accessibility of democratic values was tested (hypothesis 19).
As before, a significant effect of expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using
regression analyses, meeting the first criterion for establishing mediation (B =.548,
β=.363, SE=.092, p<.001) Second, the effect of expertise on the mediator, accessibility of
democratic values, was tested and confirmed (B =.264, β=.292, SE=.054, p<.001). Third,
the effect of accessibility of democratic values on tolerance was again tested; however,
this criterion for establishing mediation was not met (B =.047, β=.031, SE=.092, p=.611).
Sobel’s test results indicated that controlling for the effect of accessibility on tolerance
did not significantly reduce the effect of expertise on tolerance, therefore failing to
provide support for mediation by accessibility (Z=.508; SE =.024; p=.611).
Following this mediational test, mediation by accessibility while controlling for
explicit support was tested (in accordance with hypothesis 21). Again, the first criterion
testing the effect of expertise on tolerance while controlling for explicit democratic
values support was met (B =.291, β=.193, SE=.077, p<.001). Second, the effect of
expertise on the mediator (accessibility) while controlling for explicit support was tested
and met (B =.239, β=.265, SE=.057, p<.001). Third, the effect of the mediator
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(accessibility) on the DV (tolerance) was tested. This criterion was not met (B =-.022),
β=-.015, SE=.076, p=.770). Sobel’s test results further indicated that controlling for the
effect of accessibility on tolerance did not significantly diminish the effect of expertise
on tolerance, further disproving mediation (Z=-.288; SE =.018; p=.773).
Hypotheses 23-26: moderated mediation. Following the testing of the simple
mediational models predicted in study two, hypothesized moderated mediational
models were examined. First, hypotheses 23 and 25 were tested, as they both related to
the same moderated mediational model. Theses hypotheses predicted that the
relationship between expertise and tolerance would be mediated by explicit democratic
values support, which would itself be moderated by democratic value accessibility (see
Figure 7). Hypothesis 23 predicted that democratic value accessibility would not be
related to expertise, whereas hypothesis 25 predicted the same moderated mediational
model, but with a significant correlation between accessibility and expertise (again, see
Figure 7 for the distinction).
According to Preacher et al (2007), Muller et al (2005), and MacKinnon (2008),
there is evidence of moderated mediation if a) the effect of the IV on the DV is
significant; b) there is a significant effect of the mediator on the DV; and if either (or
both) of the following are met: c) there is a significant interaction between the IV and
the moderator in predicting the mediator ; or d) there is a significant interaction
between the moderator and the mediator predicting the DV. Once these prerequisites
are met, the mediational model is estimated by MODMED at high (+1 SD) and low (-1
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SD) levels of the moderator, as well as when the moderator is at the mean, and the
indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, for each level of the moderator is examined.
MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of
the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already demonstrated above (B =.305,
β=.291, SE=.081, p<.001). Second, there was a significant effect of the mediator (explicit
democratic values support) on the DV (B =.8318, SE=.079, p<.001). Third, there was a
significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator (accessibility)
predicting the mediator (explicit support) (B =-.198, SE=.062, p<.002), though note that
this interaction was not predicted by hypothesis 23 (see Figure 7). However, there was
no significant interaction between the mediator (explicit support) and the moderator
(democratic value accessibility) predicting the DV (B=.076, SE=.073, p=.302; see Tables
19 and 20 for full model coefficients).
Accordingly, there was evidence for moderation of the path between expertise
and the mediator (explicit support), providing some support for hypothesis 25. The
mediational model was then estimated for both high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of
the moderator (accessibility), using Preacher et al’s (2007) MODMED macro for SPSS
(see Table 21). Analyses revealed that explicit support for democratic values did, in fact,
significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when
accessibility was low (-1 standard deviation below the mean; B=.353, SE=.079; Z=4.46;
p<.001). However, explicit support for democratic values did not significantly mediate
the relationship between expertise and tolerance when accessibility of democratic
values was high (+1 standard deviation above the mean; B=.065, SE=.086; Z=.752,
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p=.452). This is the opposite of what was predicted in hypothesis 25, where explicit
support was predicted to be a mediator when democratic value accessibility was high.
Thus, the mediational pathway tested (and supported) in hypotheses 23 and 25 was
found to be moderated by accessibility, though not in the pattern predicted a priori (see
Tables 19, 20, and 21).
Next, the moderated mediational models predicted by hypotheses 24 and 26
were tested. This model predicted that the relationship between expertise and
tolerance would be mediated by democratic value accessibility, and that this
mediational pathway would itself be moderated by participants’ level of explicit
democratic values support (see Figure 8). Again, hypothesis 24 differed from hypothesis
26 in that the former did not presume a significant relation between expertise (the IV)
and explicit democratic values support (the moderator), whereas hypothesis 26 did
predict such a relationship (see Figure 8). MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there
was in fact a significant effect of the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already
demonstrated previously (B=.340, SE=.082, p<.001). However, there was no significant
effect of the mediator (democratic value accessibility) on the DV (B=-.001, SE=.077,
p=.909). Third, there was not a significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the
moderator (explicit support) predicting the mediator (accessibility) (B=-.068, SE=.059,
p=.252), though note that this interaction was predicted by hypothesis 26 but not 24
(see Figure 8). In addition, there was no significant interaction between the mediator
(accessibility) and the moderator (explicit support) predicting the DV (B=-.013, SE=.079,
p=.866; see Tables 22 and 23 for full model coefficients). Since the criteria for
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establishing moderated mediation were not met, the model was not estimated at
high and low levels of the moderator (explicit support), and hypotheses 24 and 26 were
not supported.
Study Two Discussion
Thirteen hypotheses were examined in this study, some of which were
replications of the hypotheses in study one, and some of which examined the impact of
a new predictor, democratic value accessibility. As in study one, expertise was found to
be a significant and strong predictor of political tolerance, even when other predictors
were taken into account as control variables. Expertise was also found to significantly
predict explicit democratic values support, as before. Expertise also significantly
predicted democratic value accessibility in this study. In a direct replication of study one,
explicit support for democratic values was found to predict political tolerance as well. In
addition, accessibility of democratic values was found to significantly predict political
tolerance. Bivariate correlational analyses revealed that these predictors were all
related, but distinct constructs.
Several mediational models were also examined in this study. In a direct
replication of study one, explicit support for democratic values was found, once again,
to mediate the relationship between expertise and political tolerance. This provided
further support to the theoretical notion that experts are, in part, more tolerant
because they value democratic norms more than do political novices. This mediational
model also held when accessibility of democratic values was controlled for. Accessibility
of democratic values was examined as a mediator, but was not supported. Similar to
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study one’s results regarding mediation by importance of democratic values, the
effect of accessibility of democratic values on tolerance did not significantly diminish the
effect of expertise on tolerance.
Several moderated mediational models were also tested. Results indicated that
the mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by explicit democratic values was
moderated by accessibility of democratic values. Namely, explicit support did mediate
the expertise-tolerance relationship when accessibility was low, but this mediational
path was no longer significant when accessibility was high. This finding is a bit curious,
and runs in the opposite direction as what was hypothesized for this model. These
results suggest that the relationship between expertise and tolerance is only accounted
for by explicit support for democratic values when those values are not accessible to the
individual forming the tolerance judgments. This may indicate that a ceiling effect
occurs when democratic values are accessible; namely, that when individuals are able to
readily and easily think of democratic values, they are more prone to provide tolerant
responses, even if they are not political experts or people otherwise inclined to be
tolerant. These results also make it clear that accessibility of democratic values is a
distinct construct from either explicit democratic values support or expertise, though it
is not as strong a predictor as these other two constructs.
Finally, mediation by accessibility and moderation by explicit support was
examined. There was, however, no support for the notion that mediation by
accessibility was moderated by explicit democratic values support.

CHAPTER SEVEN
STUDY THREE
Overview
Study two again provided support for mediation by explicit democratic values
and replicated existing evidence that tolerance is influenced by political expertise and
explicit democratic values support. Study two also examined a novel predictor that has
never been tested in the past, democratic value accessibility , and found some support
for the utility of this construct as a predictor of tolerance, if not as a mediator of the
expertise-tolerance relationship.
Study three examined many of the same predictors as in study two, with the
exception of explicit democratic values support, which had already been examined
successfully as a predictor, mediator, and moderator in both study one and two.
Instead, explicit democratic values support was replaced with implicit democratic values
support, using an altered form of the IAT (see Method section, below, for details). As
before, political tolerance, political expertise, and democratic value accessibility were
recorded, as well as the same control variables as in studies one and two. Effects of
democratic value accessibility were therefore replicated in this study.
Implicit support for democratic values was examined as a predictor of tolerance,
a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship, and a moderator of the hypothesized
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mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by accessibility. While implicit
attitudes have been examined in a variety of domains in the social psychological
literature, this study marks the first measurement and examination of implicit
democratic values as an implicit attitude and as a predictor of political tolerance. It was
anticipated that implicit support would significantly predict political tolerance and
would significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance. It was
hypothesized that implicit support for democratic values would moderate any
mediation by accessibility of democratic values that was evident in this study (though it
should be noted that accessibility was not a significant mediator in the previous study).
Finally, it was hypothesized that accessibility of democratic values would moderate any
mediation by implicit support.
Hypotheses
H27: In a direct replication of numerous previous studies, expertise will be a
strong positive predictor of tolerance.
H28: Implicit support for democratic values will predict tolerance.
H29: Accessibility of democratic values will predict tolerance.
H30: Expertise will predict implicit support for democratic values.
H31: Expertise will predict accessibility of democratic values.
H32: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by
implicit support for democratic values.
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H33: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by
accessibility of democratic values.
H34: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by
accessibility of democratic values, when controlling for implicit support.
H35: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by
implicit support for democratic values, when controlling for accessibility.
H36: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by implicit support for
democratic values for high accessibility participants. However, the effect of expertise on
tolerance is not mediated by implicit democratic values for low accessibility participants.
This hypothesis presumes that accessibility of democratic values and expertise are not
correlated, as per Muller et al’s (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation (see
Proposed Statistical Treatment, below for detail).
H37: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by accessibility for high
implicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not
mediated by accessibility for low implicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes
that implicit support for democratic values and expertise are not correlated, as per
Muller et al’s (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation.
H38: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by accessibility for high
implicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not
mediated by accessibility for low implicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes
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that implicit support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and that
accessibility and expertise are correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure
to be tested (Preacher et al, 2007).
H39: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by implicit support for high
accessibility participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated
by implicit support for low accessibility participants. This hypothesis presumes that
implicit support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and that
accessibility and expertise are correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure
to be tested (Preacher et al, 2007).
Methods
Proposed Mediators: Implicit Support for Democratic Values and Accessibility of
Democratic Values
In study three, participants’ implicit support for democratic values was assessed
as a predictor of political tolerance, as well as accessibility of democratic values. As
before, accessibility of democratic values was assessed first in this study, so it could not
be influenced by the other questions. Implicit democratic values support was assessed
after accessibility and tolerance, to prevent the implicit measure from having a priming
effect or otherwise increasing the salience of democratic values in a manner that would
influence either.
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Implicit support for democratic values. The degree to which participants
implicitly support democratic values was measured using an adapted form of the
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, McGee, &
Schwarz, 1998), based on the usage guidelines published in Nosek, Greenwald, and
Banaji (2005), and implemented using the web-based, open-source software
WINTERAMIAT by Allon (2013) . Participants were asked to group several sets of words
that appeared on their computer screen into one of two appropriate categories using
two keys on the keyboard; participants were asked to sort insects and flowers
(“horsefly”; “tulip”) into separate categories while also being asked to sort nouns and
verbs into “noun” and “verb” categories (Bosson, Swann, &Pennebaker, 2000;
Greenwald &Farnham, 2000; Nosek et al., 2002; Rudman et al., 2001). Some of the
nouns sorted were related to democratic values (e.g. “liberty”, “voter”), while most
were unrelated to the political domain (e.g. pear, computer, sink) to prevent suspicion,
and none of the verbs were related to democratic values (e.g. leap, sprint, climb).
The IAT typically features five blocks of trials, with steps 3 and 5 providing the
data to be analyzed; this study was no exception. In step 1, participants learned the first
concept dimension. Participants were asked to sort items from two different concepts
into their superordinate categories (e.g., photographs of specific insects for “Insect” and
photographs of flowers for “Flower”). Categorization was performed using two keys on
a computer keyboard that were mapped for the two categories (for example, the “a”
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key for “Insect”, and the “;” key for “Flower”) This was performed for 20 trials, though it
served as a training session and was not analyzed. In step 2, participants performed the
same task, but with new superordinate categories and items (in this case, they sorted
nouns and verbs into the “Noun” and “Verb” categories). Again, this step was a training
session lasting 20 trials, and was not analyzed. In step 3, these two sorting tasks were
combined so that respondents were asked to identify a photograph as either a “Flower”
or “Insect”, followed by a word as either a “Noun” or “Verb”. In this step, one key (“a”)
was the correct response for two categories (e.g., “Insect” and “Verb”) and the other
key (“;”) was the correct response for the remaining two categories (“Flower” and
“Noun”). Participants performed a block of 20 trials with these sorting rules (which
served as a practice block). After a brief pause, they repeated it for a second block of 40
trials (often referred to as the “critical” block, which were analyzed). In step 4,
participants learned to switch the spatial location of the concepts, such that the
stimulus items for the target concepts of interest (“Noun” and “Verb”) were sorted for
20 trials, but with a reversed key assignment (i.e., if “Verb” was originally associated
with the “;” key, it would now be associated with the “a” key, and vice versa). Finally, in
step 5, respondents sorted items from both the attribute and target concept categories
once more, the only difference being that the response key assignments now required
“Insect” and “Noun” and “Flower” and “Verb” items to be categorized with one another,
the opposite association from step 3. Respondents sorted stimulus items with this
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response assignment for 20 (unanalyzed) practice trials, and then again for 40 more
“critical” trials.
Participants’ implicit support for democratic values were determined by
examining differences in the reaction time in pairing democratic value words with
flowers, relative to the pairing of democratic value words with insects, using the
conventional IAT scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, &Banaji, 2003), which is
calculated automatically by WINTERAMIAT. The IAT effect is calculated using latency
data from Steps 3, using the software. Sorting the stimuli faster when democratic values
terms (“Nouns”) are paired with “Flower” (i.e., when “Verb” is paired with “Insect”)
than the reverse indicates a stronger association strength between democratic values
and positively-valence things, compared to the reverse mapping, or in other words
indicates an automatic preference for democratic values (Note: Greenwald et al., 2003,
describe the scoring algorithm for calculating the IAT effect in detail).
Results
Participant Demographics
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 72 years (M=34.08, SD=12.692). Most
participants reported a college degree as their highest level of education (M=4.20,
SD=1.594). Fifty-two percent of participants were male (N=132) and forty-seven percent
were female (N=118). All participants were American citizens (N=251) and ninety-six
percent of participants reported English as their first language (N=242). Participants
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were moderate in their political participation (M=3.57, SD=2.250). The most popular
least-liked groups chosen by participants were: the Ku Klux Klan (43.6%), Islamic
Fundamentalists (11.8%), Tea Party Protesters (11.6%), Fascists (8.4%), Communists
(4.8%), Anti-Abortionists (6.4%), and Pro-Abortionists (3.6%).
Study Three Main Analyses
Three sets of analyses were performed. First, linear regression analyses were
performed to test hypotheses 27-31, pertaining to simple (i.e. nonmediated) prediction
by continuous variables. Second, hypotheses 32-35 were tested using mediation
analyses in regression, following Baron and Kenney’s (1986) four-step procedure. Lastly,
hypotheses 36-39 were tested using moderated mediational analyses, employing the
bootstrapping procedure and SPSS macro created by Preacher et al (2007). In all cases,
effects reported are from analyses without controls, but have been replicated with
controls (see Appendix C for these analyses).
Hypotheses 27-31: simple linear regression analyses. The effect of political
expertise on tolerance (hypothesis 27) was tested using linear regression. Expertise was
centered and entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses
revealed, consistent with hypothesis one, that political expertise was indeed a
significant predictor of political tolerance (B= .392, β= .261 SE= .092 p<.001; see Table
24).
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The effect of implicit support for democratic values on tolerance (hypothesis 28)
was tested using linear regression. Implicit democratic values support was centered an
entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses revealed that implicit
democratic values support was indeed a significant predictor of tolerance (B= .207, β=
.138 SE= .094 p<.029; see Table 25).
The effect of democratic value accessibility on tolerance (hypothesis 29) was
tested by centering the variable and entering it as a predictor at step 1. Regression
analyses indicated that democratic value accessibility was, in fact, a significant predictor
of tolerance (B =.203, β=.135, SE=.094, p<.032, see Table 26).
In addition, expertise was examined as a predictor of implicit democratic values
support (hypothesis 30). Regression analyses revealed that expertise did significantly
predict implicit support for democratic values, (B =.315, β=.305, SE=.062, p<.001, see
Table 27).
Expertise was also examined as a predictor of democratic value accessibility
(hypothesis 31). Regression analyses revealed that political expertise was not a
significant predictor of democratic value accessibility (B= .013, β= .035 SE= .023 p=.580,
see Table 28).
Hypotheses 32-35: non-moderated mediation. Mediation of the expertisetolerance relationship by implicit democratic values support (hypothesis 32) was tested
using Baron and Kenney’s (1986) four step procedure. First, an as discussed above, a
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significant effect of expertise on tolerance was documented (B= .392, β= .261 SE= .092
p<.001). Second, and also as described above, the effect of expertise on the mediator,
implicit support of democratic values, was evident (B =.315, β=.305, SE=.062, p<.001).
Third, the effect of the mediator (implicit democratic values support) on tolerance was
tested, and found to be nonsignificant (B =.097, β=.064, SE=.096, p=.317; see Figure 9).
Adequate support for mediation by implicit democratic values support was therefore
not found.
The above mediational analyses were also reproduced when controlling for
accessibility of democratic values, as per hypothesis 35. As before, a significant effect of
expertise on tolerance (when controlling for democratic value accessibility) was
demonstrated using regression (B =.399, β=.266, SE=.091, p<.001), meeting the first
necessary criterion for establishing mediation. Second, the effect of expertise on the
mediator, implicit democratic values support, was also demonstrated when controlling
for accessibility (B =.316, β=.306, SE=.062, p<.001). Third, the effect of implicit
democratic values support on tolerance was again tested and found to be nonsignificant
(B =.091, β=.061, SE=.096, p=.341; see Figure 10). Mediation by implicit democratic
values was therefore not supported.
Next, mediation by accessibility of democratic values was tested (hypothesis 33).
As before, a significant effect of expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using
regression analyses, meeting the first criterion for establishing mediation (B= .392, β=
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.261 SE= .092 p<.001) Second, the effect of expertise on the mediator, accessibility of
democratic values, was tested and found to be nonsignificant (B =.013, β=.035, SE=.023,
p=.580; see Figure 11). This criterion of establishing not met, analyzes testing this
hypothesis were concluded.
Following this mediational test, mediation by accessibility while controlling for
implicit democratic values support was tested (in accordance with hypothesis 34).
Again, the first criterion testing the effect of expertise on tolerance while controlling for
implicit democratic values support was met (B= .362, β= .241 SE= .096 p<.001). Second,
the effect of expertise on the mediator (accessibility) while controlling for implicit
support was tested and was not significant (B =.015, β=.043, SE=.024, p=.521; see Figure
12). Again, adequate evidence for mediation by accessibility was not found and tests of
hypothesis 34 were concluded.
Hypotheses 36-39: moderated mediation. Following the testing of the simple
mediational models predicted in Study three, hypothesized moderated mediational
models were examined. First, hypotheses 36 and 39 were tested, as they both related to
the same moderated mediational model. Theses hypotheses predicted that the
relationship between expertise and tolerance would mediated by implicit democratic
values support, and would be moderated by democratic value accessibility (see Figure
13). Hypothesis 36 predicted that democratic value accessibility would not be related to
expertise, whereas hypothesis 39 predicted the same moderated mediational model,

88
but with a significant correlation between accessibility and expertise (again, see Figure
13 for the distinction).
According to Preacher et al (2007), Muller et al (2005), and MacKinnon (2008),
there is evidence of moderated mediation if a) the effect of the IV on the DV is
significant; and if either (or both) of the following is evident: b) there is a significant
effect of the mediator on the DV; or: c) there is a significant interaction between the IV
and the moderator in predicting the mediator ; and d) there is a significant interaction
between the moderator and the mediator predicting the DV (see Appendix B for a more
in-depth explanation with relevant equations). Once these prerequisites are met, the
mediational model is estimated by MODMED at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of
the moderator, as well as when the moderator is at the mean, and the indirect effect of
the IV, via the mediator, for each level of the moderator is examined (see below for a
description of how to interpret the indirect effect).
MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of
the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already demonstrated above (B =.365,
β=.354, SE=.096, p<.001). Second, there was not a significant effect of the mediator
(implicit democratic values support) on the DV (B =.119, SE=.096, p=.217). Third, there
was not a significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator
(accessibility) predicting the mediator (implicit support) (B =-.002, SE=.064, p=.971; see
Table 29), though note that this interaction was not predicted by hypothesis 36 (see
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Figure 13). However, there was a marginally significant interaction between the
mediator (implicit support) and the moderator (democratic value accessibility)
predicting the DV (B=.187, SE=.097, p=.055; see Table 30).
Accordingly, there was borderline evidence in favor of mediation by implicit
support and moderation by accessibility and so the mediational model was estimated
for participants both at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of the moderator
(accessibility) using Preacher et al’s (2007) MODMED macro for SPSS (see Table 34 for
indirect effect estimates). Analyses revealed that implicit democratic values did not
significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when
accessibility was high (+1 standard deviation above the mean; B=-.0208, SE=.041; Z=.514; p=.6076). However, implicit democratic values did marginally mediate the
relationship between expertise and tolerance when accessibility was low (-1 standard
deviation below the mean; B=.094, SE=.054; Z=1.761, p<.078), the opposite of what was
predicted in hypotheses 36 and 39.
Next, the moderated mediational model predicted by hypotheses 37 and 38
were tested. This model predicted that the relationship between expertise and
tolerance would be mediated by democratic value accessibility, and that this
mediational pathway would itself be moderated by participants’ level of implicit
democratic values support (see Figure 14). Again, hypothesis 37 differed from
hypothesis 38 in that the former did not presume a significant relation between
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expertise (the IV) and implicit democratic values support (the moderator), whereas
hypothesis 38 did predict such a relationship (see Figure 14). MODMED analyses
revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of the IV (expertise) on the DV
(tolerance), as already demonstrated previously (B=.380, SE=.094, p<.001). There was
also a significant effect of the mediator (democratic value accessibility) on the DV (B=.197, SE=.089, p<.05). Third, there was not a significant interaction between the IV
(expertise) and the moderator (implicit support) predicting the mediator (accessibility)
(B=-.025, SE=.060, p=.682; see Table 31), though note that this interaction was predicted
by hypothesis 37 but not 38 (see Figure 13). However, there was a significant interaction
between the mediator (accessibility) and the moderator (implicit support) predicting the
DV (B=-.182, SE=.093, p<.05; see Table 32).
The mediational model was then estimated for both high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD)
levels of the moderator (implicit support), using Preacher et al’s (2007) MODMED macro
for SPSS (see Table 33 for indirect effect estimates). Analyses revealed that democratic
value accessibility did not significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and
tolerance when implicit support was low (-1 standard deviation below the mean;
B=.001, SE=.014; Z=-.069; p=.954). However, democratic value accessibility did
significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when implicit
democratic values support was high (+1 standard deviation above the mean; B=-.086,
SE=.037; Z=-.163, p<.05).
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Study Three Discussion
Thirteen hypotheses were tested in study three, some of which were replications
of hypotheses examined in study two. As in all three studies, expertise was a significant
predictor of tolerance. Expertise was also found to predict implicit democratic values
support, also as hypothesized. However, expertise did not predict accessibility in this
study, inconsistent both with hypotheses and with the results of study two.
Accessibility of democratic values was a significant predictor of political
tolerance, replicating the results of study two. Further, implicit democratic values
support was also a significant predictor of tolerance, as hypothesized. Bivariate
correlational analyses revealed that these predictors were all related, but distinct
constructs.
Mediational analyses revealed that implicit democratic values support was not a
significant mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship, counter to hypotheses.
Additionally, mediation by accessibility of democratic values was not supported in this
study, in a direct replication of study two, which is consistent with that study’s results
but is inconsistent with hypotheses.
Next, moderated mediation was examined in this study. The first set of
moderated mediational models, which involved mediation of the expertise-tolerance
effect by implicit democratic values support and moderation by accessibility of
democratic values, was marginally supported. Results indicated that, in accordance with
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hypotheses 36 and 39, implicit democratic values support mediated the expertisetolerance relationship, but only among participants for whom these values were
accessible. This suggests that while implicit support for democratic values are (by
definition) not consciously considered, they still have an influence on tolerance
judgments when those values are more accessible to participants. The second set of
moderated mediational analyses, involving mediation by democratic value accessibility
and moderation by implicit democratic values support, was supported by analyses.
Results indicated that the moderator, implicit democratic values support, did moderate
the path from the mediator (accessibility) to the dependent variable (tolerance).
Specifically, it was found that accessibility was not a significant mediator of the
expertise-tolerance effect when implicit support for democratic values was low, but that
it was a significant mediator when implicit democratic values support was high.
These findings are consistent with hypotheses. These results suggest that when
an individual has a positive automatic evaluation of democratic values, accessibility of
those values helps to account for the relationship between expertise and tolerance.
However, if an individual has a negative, or relatively less positive automatic attitude
toward democratic values, the accessibility of those values does not help account for
the relationship between political expertise and tolerance. In other words, the effect of
expertise on tolerance is only partially accounted for by the accessibility of democratic
values when those democratic values are implicitly evaluated in a positive way. This
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means that among individuals with a negative automatic evaluation of democratic
values, some other mediator must account for the strong link between expertise and
tolerance, which is evident across all three studies.

CHAPTER EIGHT
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overview
The present set of three studies marks the first empirical examination of
mechanism underlying the long-established relationship between political expertise and
political tolerance. This research also serves as a useful replication of numerous existing
effects in the political psychology literature, examining effects of democratic values
support, ideology, and party on political tolerance, and effects of expertise and
democratic values support on one another. In addition, this research introduces several
constructs related to democratic values that have not been previously explored as
predictors of tolerance (and mediators of the expertise-tolerance effect): implicit
democratic values support, and democratic value accessibility. Due to the plethora of
political psychological constructs examined in these studies, and due to the frequently
close theoretical relationships between all these constructs, a number of correlations
have been observed in this body of research, as well as several mediational relationships
and moderated mediational relationships, some of which are consistent with the extant
literature, and some of which are disparate or novel.
This research has the advantage of untangling many longstanding theoretical
explanations as to why political expertise is associated with political tolerance through
94
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the use of various related, but distinct constructs. In the past, it has been hypothesized
that experts are more tolerant because they are more committed to tolerance than
novices are, because they are more aware of the “rules of the game”, or because they
are more likely to consider democratic values a relevant factor when forming tolerance
judgments. However, these numerous possible mechanisms have never been treated as
fully distinct and tested empirically; instead, researchers have examined simply whether
increases in expertise via, for example, increased civics education, leads to a
concomitant increase in tolerance (e.g. Golebiowska, 1995; Bobo & Licari, 1989; Vogt,
1997; Knudsen, 1995). By devising specific measures that tap into some of these
proposed mechanisms and analyzing them as potential mediators of the expertisetolerance relationship, this dissertation lays the groundwork for more specific, precise
experimental research on increasing tolerance in the population.
In addition, this research has the advantage of using several large, relatively
diverse and well-educated samples of Americans of voting age. Not only do the three
samples vary widely in age (especially relative to an undergraduate population), they
also exhibit strong variability in education level, political ideology, and even in their
least-liked political groups (especially relative to student samples, which
overwhelmingly select the KKK; see Price & Ottati, 2010). These participants are also far
more politically involved and engaged than the average convenience sample, reporting
an average of 2.4 political activities in the first study (including voting, volunteering for
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campaigns, and contacting political representatives), and an average of 3.5 political
activities in the second and third studies. This is in sharp contrast to student samples in
particular, who often are only recently eligible to vote and frequently have not engaged
in political activities in any significant way. This research is therefore much richer than
typical, university-based survey research in political psychology, and exhibits greater
ecological validity and generalizability to the actually voting population. When
considering matters of free speech rights and commitment to political values, a
population that is actually involved in politics is invaluable.
Because these samples are such rich potential sources of information, and
because so many of the same predictors were examined across the three studies as
continuous predictors, it is useful first to compare and contrast the bivariate
relationships between variables found in each of the three studies. These findings will
also be compared and contrasted with the preexisting political psychology literature.
Following this, the results of the simple mediational models examined in the present
three studies will be examined and contrasted with one another (and with the extant
literature). Finally, the results of the moderated mediational models tested in these
three studies will be examined and discussed, and the overall results of the dissertation
project, its limitations, and its implications for future research on political tolerance will
be explored.
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Bivariate Relations Between Variables
There is a notable internal consistency in the correlational and predictive
relationships between variables found in these three studies. In all three studies,
political expertise was a strong positive predictor of political tolerance, as was predicted
and is consistent with the existing political psychological literature. Political tolerance
was also consistently predicted by all the democratic values constructs examined in all
three studies, including explicit and implicit support, accessibility, and importance, as
was hypothesized. Also consistent with the existing political psychology literature,
political expertise was strongly positively associated with education, age, and political
participation in all three studies. This is consistent with findings going as far back as Sam
Stouffer (1955) demonstrating that higher education tends to engender greater
knowledge in the political domain (see, e.g. Bobo & Licari, 1989; Judd & Downing, 1990).
Research also has demonstrated that participation and expertise tend to be correlated,
though whether expertise engenders participation or vice versa is not entirely clear
(Krosnick, 1990; McClurg, 2006). It makes sense, given the relationship between
education and expertise and participation and expertise, that age is a positive predictor
of expertise across all three studies, as people tend to become more educated and
participate in politics more as they age (Zukin et al, 2006).
In studies two and three, political tolerance was also positively correlated with
participation and education, which should come as no surprise given the strong
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relationship between tolerance and political expertise, which is also strongly correlated
with these constructs. Because of tolerance’s strong association with expertise (which
itself appears to be engendered in part by education and participation), it comes as
something of a surprise that these variables are not related to tolerance in study one
(see results section). However, this may just be a quirk of the sample in study one,
which also exhibits a smaller (but still large and positive) correlation between expertise
and tolerance than is evident in the other two studies. Another theoretical inconsistency
that is noteworthy is the significant negative correlation between political tolerance and
political ideology evident in study three (indicating liberalism is associated with greater
tolerance). Most research in political psychology indicates a nonsignificant relationship
between political ideology (and party) and political tolerance, especially when Sullivan
et al’s (1982) least-liked procedure is used, as it controls for effects of ideology on target
group attitudes (Sullivan et al, 1981; Sullivan & Marcus, 1993; Price & Ottati, 2010).
However, there is some research indicating that ideology is sometimes related to
tolerance, including in other countries where free speech rights are not as vaulted as
they are in the US (e.g., Israel; Shamir & Sullivan, 1983) and when ideology is related to
tolerance, it is in the pattern observed in study three, with conservatives exhibiting less
tolerance than liberals (Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Mueller, 1988; Goren, 2005).
Therefore, the modest correlation between ideology and tolerance exhibited in one of
the three studies is not necessarily cause for alarm or suspicion that the sample in that
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study is inappropriate; however, it does indicate that there is some variability between
these three mTurk sample populations, even though they were collected in a similar
manner at roughly the same time.
In most cases, hypotheses involving expertise and the other political constructs
were supported. Expertise is significantly positively correlated with implicit and explicit
democratic values support in all instances, as hypothesized. Somewhat surprisingly,
expertise is not associated with democratic values importance in study one (the only
study in which importance was measured). Neither is importance associated with
explicit democratic values support in study one (which was not hypothesized explicitly).
Despite these two rather surprising null effects, importance of democratic values is, in
fact, a significant positive predictor of political tolerance. This indicates that an
individual’s subjective weighting of democratic values as important accounts for some
unique variance in the individual’s level of political tolerance. This points to the
necessity of untangling importance and explicit support as unique predictors and
possible mechanisms of the expertise-tolerance effect, one of the major advantages of
these three studies over existing theoretical work on this topic. Importance of
democratic values, long hypothesized to be a possible mechanism underlying the
expertise-tolerance relationship, is shown instead to be a predictor of tolerance wholly
unrelated to expertise in this study. This effectively allows for one of the possible
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mediators of the expertise-tolerance relationship to be ruled out (see the discussion of
moderated mediational models, below, for greater detail).
Also worthy of note is the fact that expertise is positively correlated with
democratic value accessibility in study two but not in study three. Future research
should attempt to replicate the relationship between these constructs that was
apparent in study two, to determine whether it is a true relationship or simply a type I
error in that study. Theoretically, it makes sense that those who are knowledgeable
about politics are more prone to call democratic values to mind in a neutral, nonpolitical
task (such as a word completion test, as in these two studies); however, accessibility of
an abstract construct such as democratic values can also be subtly influenced by a
myriad cues and primes preceding the accessibility measure that are not related to
participants’ actual political attitudes and predilections. Relatedly, democratic value
accessibility was found to be significantly positively correlated with explicit democratic
values in study two, but not with implicit democratic values in study three. The
relationship between democratic value accessibility and tolerance is also more modest
than the other predictors of tolerance examined in these three studies (explicit and
implicit democratic values support, expertise, and importance of democratic values). All
of these results serve to bolster the notion that accessibility is not caused as consistently
by participants’ political attitudes and demographics as the other political constructs
are. This makes sense theoretically; accessibility of an abstract construct is more fleeting
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and more readily influenced by irrelevant external cues than any of the other constructs
are.
The remaining significant bivariate relationships uncovered in these three
studies are fairly typical of the political psychology literature. As is usually the case,
political ideology and political party are strongly positively correlated in all studies. Party
and ideology are also consistently negatively correlated with both implicit and explicit
democratic values support (indicating that conservatives and Republicans express less
support for democratic values). Age and ideology are positively correlated, indicating
greater conservatism among older participants (see, e.g., Van Hiel et al 2000 for similar
results). Other than the instances noted above, there is a great deal of consistency
between the three studies, and with the extant literature in general, which speaks to
the validity of the mTurk sample.
Simple Mediation Results
The results of these three studies also allow for some of the proposed
mediational pathways explored in the introduction of this paper to be ruled out as
possible mechanisms underlying the expertise-tolerance relationship, and for other
possible mechanisms has provided some preliminary empirical support. Both study one
and study two demonstrate strong evidence for mediation of the expertise-tolerance
effect by explicit democratic values support. In both studies, controlling for the effect of
explicit support on tolerance causes the effect of expertise on tolerance to drop into
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nonsignificance; furthermore, this mediational path remains significant when controlling
for importance of democratic values (in study one) and accessibility of democratic
values (in study two). This provides a great deal of support to the existing, but until this
point purely theoretical notion expressed in the political psychology literature that
experts are more tolerant because they have more respect for the “rules of the
democratic game” (Sullivan et al, 1993; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Furthermore, the
consistency of this effect across studies further supports the finding, as does the extent
to which explicit support eradicates the expertise-tolerance effect; by conventional
metrics, explicit support can be said to fully mediate the effect of explicit support on
tolerance (Rucker et al, 2011).
Other simple mediational models tested in these studies fared less well. In study
one, democratic values importance was a significant predictor of tolerance, but
expertise was not a predictor of importance, obviating the possibility of mediation. This
suggests that importance of democratic values accounts, perhaps, for some unique
variance in tolerance that is not accounted for by either expertise or explicit democratic
values support. Future research should attempt to replicate this null mediational effect
and attempt to discern which political variables do actually contribute to a voter’s
subjective rating of the importance of democratic values, if not expertise or explicit
support of those same values. No other political constructs in these studies predicted
democratic values importance; further research should examine whether, for example,
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civics education or social capital influence democratic values importance, as has been
theorized (Putnam, 2001; Sullivan & Transue, 1999).
Results were also tepid on mediation by accessibility of democratic values. In
study two, accessibility was found to not be a mediator of the expertise-tolerance
relationship, because accessibility did not remain a significant predictor of tolerance
when expertise was included in analyses (and because the effect of expertise on
tolerance did not significantly diminish when accessibility was included in analyses). In
study three, expertise was not a significant predictor of accessibility of democratic
values (see above discussion), so mediation by accessibility was also not supported in
that study. This lack of support for mediation by accessibility was also apparent when
controlling for explicit support (in study two) and implicit support (in study three). Thus,
while further research may be warranted to determine whether expertise and
accessibility are truly related (given the inconsistency between studies) there is little
support for mediation of the expertise-tolerance effect by this construct.
Finally, implicit support for democratic values was explored as a mediator, and
also failed to account for the expertise-tolerance relationship. Study three results
demonstrated that while implicit democratic values support did predict tolerance, it did
not remain a significant predictor of the DV when expertise was included in analyses,
precluding the possibility of mediation. Further, the effect of expertise on tolerance did
not diminish when the effect of implicit support was accounted for; rather, the effect of
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expertise actually increased. Future research should attempt to replicate this effect to
be certain, as there is a notable effect of implicit support on tolerance, though there is
no support for this mediational pathway at this juncture. The results of the three studies
are thus quite consistent: explicit support for democratic values seems, far and away, to
best account for the relationship between expertise and tolerance that is so
longstanding in the political psychology literature.
Moderated Mediation
Because several mediational pathways hypothesized in studies one, two, and
three were not supported empirically, many of the related hypothesized moderated
mediational models were also unsupported. Moderated mediation where importance
served as a mediator in study one, for example, were entirely unsupported due to the
fact that expertise was not a significant predictor of importance in the simple
mediational model. However, a model where importance of democratic values
moderated the mediation by explicit democratic values was still theoretically and
empirically possible, and was tested in study one; results indicated that importance of
democratic values did, in fact, moderate the mediational pathway. Specifically, explicit
support for democratic values was found to not mediate the expertise-tolerance
relationship when importance was low; whoever, when importance of democratic
values was high, explicit democratic values support did significantly mediate the
expertise-tolerance relationship.
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This finding was predicted by hypothesis 10 (see introduction) and makes
intuitive theoretical sense. Experts, who generally are more likely to support democratic
values, only allow those values to influence their tolerance judgments when they deem
the values to be important enough. When experts are supportive of democratic values
but do not deem democratic values to be as importance (for example, if they value
public order or public decency to a greater extent than equality under the law), they do
not allow those values to influence their tolerance attitudes. Future research should
examine which factors do mediate the expertise-tolerance relationship when
importance is low, and should examine the effect of other value importance ratings
(such as the aforementioned public safety or decency values) to determine what factors
are considered relevant to tolerance judgments by participants who deem democratic
values to not be the paramount value.
Study two presented moderated mediational results that are much more difficult
to parse. Tests of hypotheses 23 and 25 established that accessibility did moderate the
mediation by explicit democratic values support, as predicted; however, the pattern of
results ran counter to what was hypothesized. Specifically, explicit democratic values
support mediated the expertise-tolerance relationship when democratic value
accessibility was low, but not when it was high. This runs counter to the hypothesized
effect predicted by hypotheses 23 and 25. These results suggest that explicit democratic
values support accounts for the effect of expertise on tolerance, but only when those
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democratic values are not being readily considered/accessed by the participant. This
implies that among experts, democratic values influence attitudes only when those
value is inaccessible, which is inconsistent with the hypotheses and does not make much
sense. One alternate explanation for this pattern of results is that when accessibility of
democratic values is high, individuals are more likely to express tolerant positions,
regardless of their actual degree of explicit support for those values. This jibes
somewhat with the finding observed in previous research that tolerance is often an
automatic “knee-jerk” for experts, rather than an effortful weighing of competing
factors and values (e.g. Price & Ottati, 2010, Kuklinski et al, 1993). Future research
should attempt to replicate this effect, especially in light of the fact that the relationship
between accessibility and expertise is not consistent between studies two and three.
Study two results failed to support the alternate moderated mediational models
predicted in hypotheses 24 and 26, which posited mediation by accessibility and
moderation by explicit support.
Finally, study three examined mediation by implicit democratic values support
and moderation by accessibility. This moderated mediational model was ultimately not
supported, however, due to a lack of an effect of the mediator (implicit support) on the
DV, as well as the lack of an interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator
(accessibility) predicting the mediator (implicit support). Thus, accessibility was not
found to behave as a moderator when implicit democratic values served as a mediator,
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despite the fact that it was a significant moderator of mediation by explicit support in
study two. However, the failure of this moderated mediational model can be accounted
for by the fact that in this study a) implicit support did not mediate the effect of
expertise on tolerance, and b) expertise did not significantly predict accessibility of
democratic values. Again, future research should examine this model further, or at least
attempt to replicate the underlying findings, especially since the findings in study two
ran counter to hypotheses.
Study three also examined mediation by accessibility and moderation by implicit
democratic values support. There was sufficient empirical support for this model,
specifically the model where implicit support moderated the pathway between
accessibility and tolerance. Results indicated that accessibility did mediate the expertisetolerance relationship when implicit democratic values support was high, but not when
implicit democratic values support was low. This suggests that experts’ automatic,
implicit evaluations of democratic values only influenced their tolerance judgments
when those automatic values were actually readily accessible to them, but not when
such values were not readily accessed. This is essentially consistent with hypothesis 37
and makes intuitive theoretical sense. However, it is inconsistent somewhat with the
results of study two, which found that explicit support only mediated the expertisetolerance relationship when accessibility was low. However, since the mediators in
question here are quite distinct (explicit versus implicit support) in both measurement
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and in their relationship with the other variables in these studies, neither result
necessarily invalidates or calls into question the other.

CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Overview
The present research proposed and tested several possible mechanisms
underlying the relationship between expertise and tolerance, which were inspired by
both political psychological and social psychological theoretical work that had not, to
date, been empirically examined. The results of these studies help to rule out some of
the proposed mechanism and have provided strong support for others. While tolerance
is influenced to some degree by explicit support of democratic values, implicit support
of democratic values, important of democratic values, and accessibility of democratic
values, most of these constructs do not account for the relationship between expertise
and tolerance to any significant degree. Across multiple studies, explicit democratic
values support was found to be the only significant mediator of the expertise-tolerance
effect, while the other three potential mediators were not supported. This suggests that
experts are, as hypothesized by many, more tolerant by virtue of the greater
endorsement of values such as freedom of speech and equality under the law.
These results should be used to inform future empirical research on the ways in
which tolerance can be increased in the population. Past research has suggested that
one of the methods by which tolerance can be increased is through increased education
in general (e.g. Bobo & Licari, 1989), or increased civics education in particular (Sullivan
109
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& Transue, 1999), because the resultant increases in political expertise seemed to drive
an increase in political tolerance. While this remains a reasonable approach, increasing
individuals’ support for democratic norms and values may be a more direct tactic; at the
very least, these results suggest that civics education programs should place emphasis
on the centrality of democratic norms to the functioning of a healthy democratic
system, rather than on other aspects of the democratic process or on procedural facts, if
the goal is to increase tolerance.
The results of these studies also shed some light on more complex relationships
between multiple political predictors. As stated above, mediation by explicit democratic
values support was found quite clearly to be moderated by importance of democratic
values. That is, explicit democratic values support only accounts for the relationship
between expertise and tolerance when democratic values are upheld by the expert as
important values worthy of consideration. This indicates that simple endorsement of
democratic values is not enough; these values must be vaulted and seen as paramount
in order for them to influence tolerance. This has been suggested previously by the
Flexible Deliberation Model of Political Tolerance (Price & Ottati, 2010), which posits
that tolerance judgments inherently involve numerous competing values, and the
attitude at which a person arrives may depend a great deal on which values or factors
they deem worthy of consideration. This result also should inform future research and
possibly public policy: again, simple civics education may not be sufficient to bolster

111
tolerance, for democratic values must not only be taught and accepted, but seen as
crucial values that are more important than other competing values.
Moderated mediational results in these studies also suggest that the mediation
of the expertise-tolerance relationship by explicit support is moderated by accessibility
of democratic values. Study two results, while unhypothesized, indicate that individuals’
explicit democratic values support influences tolerance only when those values are not
readily accessible. Future research should attempt to replicate this effect; importantly,
future research must determine whether political expertise and accessibility are, in fact,
related or not, as there was some inconsistency in the results of these studies. If the
results of study two are supported by additional studies, some theoretical work will be
necessary to make sense of how a value can be most influential when it is inaccessible;
in particular, research might attempt to manipulate the accessibility of democratic
values directly rather than measure it as an temporary individual difference, to see if
this pattern holds.
Last, results of study three indicated that implicit support may only mediate the
expertise-tolerance relationship when accessibility of democratic values is high (though
the results of study two suggest the reverse). Again, this result seems inconsistent with
the results of study two, and additional work is necessary to determine the exact
relationship between expertise, accessibility, democratic values support (both explicit
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and implicit), and tolerance. However, the results of study three do make the greatest
theoretical sense of the two disparate findings.
Implications and Future Directions
These studies demonstrate that expertise, long vaunted as one of the premier
predictors of tolerance, has a far more complex relationship with the construct that has
previously been examined. In large part, the effect of expertise on tolerance is
accounted for by explicit endorsement of democratic values. This is especially the case
when democratic values are both supported and seen as important values worthy of
consideration when forming judgments. Future research should determine the best
method by which explicit support for democratic values can be increased, in order to
find useful methods of increasing tolerance in the voting population. Some possibilities
include improved education, improved civics education, persuasive materials about the
value and importance of democratic values, increased social capital, and increased trust
in the government or political system (see, e.g. Putnam, 2000; 2001).
In addition, future experimental research should examine ways of increasing
subjective importance of democratic values, using some of the same methods, as well as
simple persuasive messages regarding the value of democratic norms in society. Not
only should this be examined as a permanent persuasive goal; experimental work
should also work on developing methods of enticing participants to temporarily
consider democratic values a relevant and important factor when forming tolerance
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judgments in the short-term. Priming methods, explicit directions, group discussions
about the importance of democratic values, and persuasive materials are among some
of the options. In a similar vein, accessibility of democratic values should be
experimentally manipulated as well, using priming methods or value rehearsal, to see if
there are short-term increases in tolerance as a result. Research should also examine
and confirm the relationship between expertise and accessibility of democratic values,
both as an individual difference and manipulated variable.
Finally, additional research should examine in greater detail the relationship
between education (both general and civics-based) and participation, expertise,
democratic values support, and political tolerance. Existing research as well as the
present sets of studies strongly suggests that there is a strong, significant positive
relationship between all of these predictors and tolerance. The exact directionality of
their relationships is, however unknown. It is likely, for example, that education
promotes both political expertise and democratic values support, both of which lead to
greater tolerance, but the exact path is, as of yet, untested. For example, general
education might increase expertise in a variety of domains, including political expertise,
which might in turn influence tolerance. However, civics education might influence both
political expertise and democratic values support, which might in turn promote
tolerance. Mediational pathways of this sort should be tested; in addition, experimental
or quasi-experimental designs should be employed to determine whether increased
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knowledge leads to greater tolerance, and whether this is accounted for by expertise or
democratic values support.
Similar research should be conducted to clarify the role of political participation.
In all three of the present studies, political participation was related to tolerance and
expertise. This finding is not new (see Introduction). However, the directionality of the
relationship is somewhat ambiguous and worthy of deeper exploration. For example,
individuals who are already quite knowledgeable about politics might be more inclined
to both participate in politics and provide tolerant responses; in such case, participation
may have no causal role in tolerance whatsoever. However, the act of participating in
politics could also conceivably influence a voter’s understanding of the political
landscape, inform their attitudes regarding democratic values, and boost or diminish
their tolerance as a result. For example, working at the polls might expose a voter to
other volunteers who are committed to the democratic process, but who differ from
themselves in political attitudes. This experience of participation could increase political
tolerance directly, or it might indirectly increase tolerance by increasing support for
democratic values. Future research should employ both survey and experimental
methodologies to examine the predictors of participation, as well as its effects.
Limitations
The results of these studies do come with a few caveats. First are the limitations
of the sample: these participants were all mTurk users of eligible voting age in the
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summer of 2013, with computer access, United-States-based IP addresses, and
citizenship and English proficiency. Accordingly, this sample probably has greater
education, income, and political interest than the average American voter. Research on
mTurk user demographics suggest as much (Ross et al, 2010; Buhrmester et al, 2011)
and also indicate that mTurk users are highly cognitively motivated and take part in
online surveys in part for entertainment and educational purposes. Voting-age adults
who do not have access to a computer, do not know about mTurk, or who are
disinterested in such activities are thus excluded from the sample, which may influence
the pattern of results. While the mTurk sample is far more diverse in age, region of the
country, and education than are typical student samples, additional research should be
conducted to replicate these results in different, more representative populations.
This research is also limited by the discrepancy between results in studies two
and three, most notably regarding the effect of expertise on accessibility (or rather, the
lack of one in study three). Study three is also anomalous in the sense that, in that
sample, ideology is found to be related to political tolerance, which has not generally
been found in related studies, including other studies using mTurk not included in this
dissertation (e.g. Price & Ottati 2010; Price & Ottati 2012). Also surprising is the results
of the moderated mediational model found to be significant in study two, which has
already been discussed at length. Due to these limitations, replication is a must,
including potentially replication using a different sample population.
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A final limitation is the correlational nature of this data. Since these studies
represented the first empirical examinations of the mechanisms underlying the
expertise-tolerance relationship, and since the constructs theorized to be relevant were
political individual differences, it made sense to first examine these predictors as
continuous, measured variables rather than manipulating them experimentally.
However, now that these results have been analyzed, experimental research into the
same mediational effects is a prudent next step.
Conclusion
Mass public intolerance is a longstanding problem that has vexed political
scientists and psychologists alike for many decades. Throughout years of survey and
experimental study, several facts about tolerant individuals have reliably been
demonstrated: tolerant people have greater political knowledge, and they express
greater support for the democratic values that underlie tolerance itself. This research
represents an initial test of what has long been suggested by the literature: expertise
engenders tolerance because it also engenders a greater commitment to democratic
norms. This research has tested a variety of possible mechanisms and has yielded
several clear findings that should inform future research into political tolerance, as well
as future attempts at bolstering tolerance in the lay populace. The research has also
established several relationships that are in need of further experimental inquiry. These
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results will inform a continuing program of research focused on the antecedents to
tolerance.

APPENDIX A
TABLES AND FIGURES
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Table 1. Correlation Matrix For Continuous Variables Analyzed In Study One
Tolerance

Explicit
Support

Expertise

Democratic
Values
Importance

Education

Age

Participation

Ideology

Party

Tolerance

1.00

Explicit
Support
Expertise

.216**

1.00

.167**

.270**

1.00

Democratic
Values
Importance
Education

.181*

.086

.046

1.00

.061

.216**

.401**

.027

1.00

Age

.073

.066

.358**

.131*

.243**

1.00

Participation

.029

.156*

.344**

-.094

.180*

.035

1.00

Ideology

.058

-.022

.018

.056

.007

.133*

-.109

1.00

Party

.047

-.020

-.047

.021

-.042

.042

-.110

.794**

1.00

Attitude
Least Liked

-.105

-.037

-.020

.025

.023

-.043

-.015

.056

.023

Attitude
Least Liked

1.00

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level; * significant at the p<.05 level; ** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix For Continuous Variables Analyzed In Study Two
Tolerance

Explicit
Support

Expertise

Democratic
Values
Accessibility

Education

Age

Participation

Ideology

Party

Tolerance

1.00

Explicit
Support
Expertise

.618**

1.00

.372**

.323**

1.00

Democratic
Values
Accessibility
Education

.137**

.170**

.292**

1.00

.249**

.076

.366**

.038

1.00

Age

.017

.030

.246**

.066

.217**

1.00

Participation

.252**

.193**

.366**

.118

.325**

.089

Ideology

-.122

-.204**

.007

.015

.040

.148* -.132

1.00

Party

-.041

-.163**

.022

.042

.097

.113

.021

.751**

1.00

Attitude
Least Liked

-.900

-.025

-.080

-.113

.050

-.047

-.065

.079

.041

Attitude
Least
Liked

1.00

1.00

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level; * significant at the p<.05 level; ** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix For Continuous Variables Analyzed In Study Three
Tolerance

Implicit
Support

Expertise

Democratic
Values
Accessibility

Education

Age

Participation

Ideology

Party

Tolerance

1.00

Implicit
Support
Expertise

.138*

1.00

.261**

.305**

1.00

Democratic
Values
Accessibility
Education

.135*

.012

.035

1.00

.170**

.056

.268**

-.047

1.00

Age

.045

.244**

.365**

.093

.172*

1.00

Participation

.287**

.250**

.440**

.043

.323**

.292**

1.00

Ideology

-.182*

-.144**

-.050

.151

-.121

.087

-.233**

1.00

Party

-.025

-.049**

.068

.099

-.132

.066

-.153*

.774**

1.00

Attitude
Least Liked

-.045

-.184**

-.247**

-.038

-.129*

-.058

-.249**

.125*

.058

Attitude
Least
Liked

1.00

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level; * significant at the p<.05 level; **significant at the p<.01 level.

121

122
Table 4. Expertise Predicting Tolerance In Study One
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
4.082**
.056
Expertise
.147*
.056
.167*
R²
.130
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 5. Explicit Democratic Values Support Predicting Tolerance In Study One
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
4.081**
.055
Explicit
.191*
.055
.216*
Democratic
Values
Support
R²
.216
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 6. Importance Of Democratic Values Predicting Tolerance In Study One
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
4.089**
.055
Importance of
.158*
.055
.181*
Democratic
Values
R²
.181
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 7. Expertise Predicting Explicit Democratic Values Support In Study One
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
-.015**
.062
Expertise
.272**
.062
.270*
R²
.073
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 8. Expertise Predicting Importance Of Democratic Values In Study One
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.539**
.125
Expertise
.087
.124
.046
R²
.046
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Figure 1. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise
And Tolerance As Mediated By Explicit Democratic Values Support In Study One

The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while
controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.
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Figure 2. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise
And Tolerance As Mediated By Explicit Democratic Values Support (When Controlling
For Importance)

The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while
controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.

Figure 3. The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypotheses 10 And 12

Table 9. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model
Specified In Hypotheses 10 And 12 (Study One)
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
-.001**
.062
Expertise
.263**
.063
.167**
Expertise x
-.066
.063
.056
Importance
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 10. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation
Model Specified In Hypothesis 10 And 12 (Study One)
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
4.073**
.053
Expertise
.094*
.055
.082*
Importance
.183**
.057
.161**
Expertise x
-.003
.056
.001
Importance
Explicit
-.219**
.056
.184**
Support
Explicit
-.191**
.061
.185**
Support x
Importance
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 11. Indirect Effects As Specified By The Moderated Mediation Model In Hypothesis
10 And 12 (Study One)
Importance
Indirect
SE
Z
P> Z
Effect
-1 SD (-.9824)
-.0084
.0216
-.3879
.6981
Mean (.0122)
-.0582**
.0206
-2.8211**
.0048
- 1 SD
-.1044**
.0463
-2.2578**
.0240
(1.0067)
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Figure 4. The Moderated Mediation Model Specified By Hypotheses 11 And 13

Table 12. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Model Specified In Hypotheses 11
And 13 (Study One)
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
.0323**
.068
Expertise
.023
.069
-.033
Expertise x
.074
.062
-.063
Explicit
Support
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 13. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation
Model Specified In Hypothesis 11 And 13 (Study One)
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
4.098**
.055
Expertise
.091
.054
.082
Importance
.174*
.057
.161*
Expertise x
.093
.050
.097
Explicit
Support
Explicit
-.239**
.057
-.220**
Support
Explicit
-.1890*
.058
-.185*
Support x
Importance
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 14. Expertise Predicting Tolerance In Study Two
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
4.937**
.088
Expertise
.561**
.088
.372**
R²
.139
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 15. Explicit Democratic Values Support Predicting Tolerance In Study Two
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.937**
.074
Explicit
.932*
.075
.618*
Democratic
Values
Support
R²
.382
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 16. Democratic Value Accessibility Predicting Tolerance In Study Two
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.937**
.094
Democratic
.207*
.094
.137*
value
accessibility
R²
.019
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 17. Expertise Predicting Explicit Democratic Values Support In Study Two
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
5.465**
.078
Expertise
.425**
.078
.323**
R²
.104
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 18. Expertise Predicting Accessibility Of Democratic Values In Study Two
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
1.165**
.054
Expertise
.264**
.054
.292**
R²
.085
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Figure 5. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise
And Tolerance As Mediated By Explicit Democratic Values Support In Study Two

The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while
controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.
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Figure 6. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise
And Tolerance As Mediated By Explicit Democratic Values Support (When Controlling
For Accessibility) In Study Two

The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while
controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.

Figure 7. The Moderated Mediational Model Predicted By Hypotheses 23 And 25
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Table 19. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model
Specified In Hypotheses 23 And 25 (Study Two)
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
.058
.061
Expertise
.269**
.062
.188**
Accessibility
.126
.063
.132
Expertise x
-.198**
.062
.195**
Accessibility
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 20. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation
Model Specified In Hypothesis 23 And 25 (Study Two)
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.945**
.077
Expertise
.305**
.081
.297**
Accessibility
-.014
.079
-.012
Expertise x
-.068
.082
-.064
Accessibility
Explicit
.832**
.079
.823**
Support
Explicit
.076
.073
.069
Support x
Accessibility
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 21. Indirect Effects As Specified By The Moderated Mediation Model In
Hypotheses 23 And 25 (Study Two)
Accessibility
Indirect
SE
Z
P> Z
Effect
-1 SD
.353**
.079
4.464**
.0000
Mean
.224**
.056
4.018**
.0001
- 1 SD
.065
.086
.752
.4519
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Figure 8. The Moderated Mediational Model Predicted By Hypotheses 24 And 26

Table 22. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model
Specified In Hypotheses 24 And 26 (Study Two)
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
.022
.063
Expertise
.244**
.066
.221**
Explicit
.073
.064
.071
Support
Expertise x
-.068
.059
-.067
Accessibility
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 23. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation
Model Specified In Hypothesis 24 And 26 (Study Two)
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.888**
.076
Expertise
.340**
.082
.324**
Explicit
.863
.078
.835
Support
Expertise x
.159
.081
.135
Explicit
Support
Accessibility
-.001
.077
-.001
Explicit
-.013
.080
-.012
Support x
Accessibility
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 24. Expertise Predicting Tolerance In Study Three
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.733**
.092
Expertise
.392**
.092
.261**
R²
.068
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 25. Implicit Democratic Values Support Predicting Tolerance In Study Three
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.733**
.094
Implicit
.207*
.094
.138*
Democratic
Values
Support
R²
.019
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 26. Accessibility Predicting Tolerance In Study Three
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.733**
.094
Accessibility
.203*
.094
.135*
of Democratic
Values
Support
R²
.018
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 27. Expertise Predicting Implicit Support In Study Three
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
6.203**
.062
Expertise
.315**
.061
.305**
R²
.093
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 28. Expertise Predicting Accessibility In Study Three
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
.414**
.023
Expertise
.013
.023
.035
R²
.001
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Figure 9. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise
And Tolerance As Mediated By Implicit Democratic Values Support In Study Three
(Without Controls)

The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while
controlling for implicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.
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Figure 10. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise
And Tolerance As Mediated By Implicit Democratic Values Support (When Controlling
For Accessibility) In Study Three

The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while
controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.

Figure 11. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise
And Tolerance As Mediated By Accessibility Of Democratic Values In Study Three

The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while
controlling for accessibility is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.
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Figure 12. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise
And Tolerance As Mediated By Accessibility Of Democratic Values In Study Three (While
Controlling For Implicit Support)

The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while
controlling for accessibility is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.

Figure 13. The Moderated Mediational Model Predicted By Hypotheses 36 And 39 (In
Study Three)
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Table 29. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model
Specified In Hypotheses 36 And 39 (Study Three)
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
.001
.060
Expertise
.306**
.061
.287**
Accessibility
.023
.061
.018
Expertise x
.002
.064
.001
Accessibility
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 30. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation
Model Specified In Hypothesis 36 And 39 (Study Three)
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.727**
.091
Expertise
.365**
.096
.307**
Accessibility
-.215*
.913
-.187*
Expertise x
.105
.099
.076
Accessibility
Implicit
.119
.096
.113
Support
Implicit
-.187*
.097
-.142
Support x
Accessibility
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Figure 14. The Moderated Mediation Model Predicted By Hypotheses 37 And 38 (In
Study Three)

Table 31. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model
Specified In Hypotheses 37 And 38 (Study Three)
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
.008
.066
Expertise
.041
.067
.023
Expertise x
-.025
.060
-.017
Implicit
Support
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 32. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation
Model Specified In Hypotheses 37 And 38 (Study Three)
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.66**
.093
Expertise
.380**
.094
.342**
Implicit
.236*
.10
.219*
Support
Expertise x
.243**
.085
.220**
Implicit
Support
Accessibility
-.197*
.089
.184*
Accessibility x
-.182*
.093
.163*
Implicit
Support
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 33. Indirect Effects As Specified By The Moderated Mediation Model In
Hypotheses 37 And 38 (Study Three)
Implicit
Indirect
SE
Z
P> Z
Support
Effect
-1 SD
-.001
.014
-.068
.945
Mean
-.008
.015
-.094
.593
- 1 SD
-.086*
.037
-.163*
.024
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 34. Indirect Effects As Specified By The Moderated Mediation Model In
Hypotheses 36 And 39 (Study Three)
Accessibility
Indirect
SE
Z
P> Z
Effect
-1 SD
.0944+
.054
1.761
.078
Mean
.0364
.031
1.178
.239
- 1 SD
-.0208
.041
-.514
.608
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Statistical Treatment Details
Simple Mediation
As per Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure, simple mediation will be tested
using the following three regression models, with expertise as X, tolerance as Y, and the
mediator as M.
1. Y = B1 + B2X + e1
2. M= B3 + B4X + e2
3. Y= B5 + B6X + B7M +e3
To demonstrated mediation, the following four conditions must be met:
1. In equation 1, there must be an overall effect of expertise on tolerance. B2
must be significant.
2. In equation 2, there must be an effect of the expertise on the mediator; B4
must be significant.
3. In equation 3, there must be an effect of the mediator on the DV when
controlling for the IV; B7 must be significant.
4. In equation 3, the effect of the IV on the DV must be reduced from the
overall effect of the IV on the DV in equation 1.
Condition 4 is satisfied by computing Sobel’s (1982) test. In the below equation a
represents the raw coefficient for the effect of the IV on the mediator (sa2 is the
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standard error of a), and b represents the raw coefficient for the effect of the
mediator on the DV (sb is the standard error of b; note that the critical value for a
two-tailed Sobel’s test at p<.05 is 1.96:
z-value = a*b/SQRT (b2*sa2 + a2*sb2)
If the Sobel’s test is significant at the p<.05 level, there is evidence of mediation.
Simple Mediation with Controls
As per Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure, simple mediation will be tested
using the following three regression models, with expertise as X, tolerance as Y, the
control as C and the mediator as M.
4. Y = B1 + B2X + B8C e1
5. M= B3 + B4X + B9C e2
6. Y= B5 + B6X + B7M + B10C +e3
To demonstrated mediation, the following four conditions must be met:
5. In equation 1, there must be an overall effect of expertise on tolerance. B2
must be significant.
6. In equation 2, there must be an effect of the expertise on the mediator; B4
must be significant.
7. In equation 3, there must be an effect of the mediator on the DV when
controlling for the IV; B7 must be significant.
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8. In equation 3, the effect of the IV on the DV must be reduced from the
overall effect of the IV on the DV in equation 1.
Condition 4 is satisfied by computing Sobel’s (1982) test. In the below equation a
represents the raw coefficient for the effect of the IV on the mediator (sa2 is the
standard error of a), and b represents the raw coefficient for the effect of the
mediator on the DV (sb is the standard error of b; note that the critical value for a
two-tailed Sobel’s test at p<.05 is 1.96:
z-value = a*b/SQRT (b2*sa2 + a2*sb2)
If the Sobel’s test is significant at the p<.05 level, there is evidence of mediation.
Moderated Mediation: If Expertise and the Moderator are Uncorrelated (e.g.,
Hypothesis 10)
As per Muller et al’s (2005) description of how to evaluate moderated
mediation, predictors will be centered and entered into the three following regression
equations, where X is the independent variable (expertise), Y is the dependent variable
(tolerance), M is the mediator (explicit support for democratic norms), and W is the
moderator (importance of democratic norms):
Equation 1: Y = β1 + β2X + β3W + β4XW + ε1
Equation 2: M = β5 + β6X + β7W + β8XW + ε2
Equation 3: Y = β9 + β10X + β11W + β12XW + β13M + β14MW + ε3
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Following Muller et al’s (2005) procedure, to have evidence of moderated
mediation the following conditions must be met:
1. The interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator (importance) in its
effect on the DV (tolerance) must be nonsignificant in equation 1 (β4).
2. At least one of the following must be evident:
a. Either both the interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator
(importance) must be significant predicting the mediator (explicit
support; β8 in equation 2) and the effect of the mediator (explicit
support) on the DV must be significant (β13 in equation 3).
b. Both the effect of the IV (expertise) on the mediator (explicit support; β6
in equation 2) and the interaction term between the mediator (explicit
support) and the moderator (importance) on the DV (tolerance) must be
significant (β14 in equation 3).
If there is evidence of moderated mediation, the following regression can be
used (with coefficients taken from the above equations) to calculate simple
overall effects at different levels of the mediator (+1 and -1 standard deviation):
β2 + β4W
The moderated indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, is:
(β6 + β8W)(β13 + β14W)
The residual effect of the IV is:
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β10 + β12W
These equations can be used to estimate simple effects at high and low levels of
the moderator.
If the prerequisites for moderated mediation are apparent using this procedure,
indirect effects of the IV, via the mediator at high (+1 SD) and low (-1SD) levels of the
moderator, (as per Preacher et al, 2007, Ng et al, 2008 & Muller et al, 2005). The
resulting indirect effects tests are reported in a separate table in Appendix A. Note: in
moderated mediation, the indirect effect score represents the portion of the relation
between the IV and the DV that is accounted for the mediator (at that particular level of
the moderator). Thus, a high, significant indirect effect score and corresponding z-score
indicates that the effect of the IV on the DV has actually dropped in significance when
the effect of the mediator has been included, and therefore is the functional equivalent
of a Sobel’s test when testing moderated mediation (see Pearl, 2001, for a discussion of
indirect and direct effects).
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Table 35. Expertise Predicting Explicit Democratic Values Support With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
-.442
.206
Expertise
.197*
.071
.196*
Participation
.049
.045
.072
Education
.073+
.040
.123+
R²
.091
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 36. Expertise Predicting Importance Of Democratic Values With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
-.515**
.207
Expertise
.112
.068
.113
Age
.016**
.006
.185**
R²
.032
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 37. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 10 With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
-.001**
.062
Expertise
.263**
.063
.167**
Expertise x
-.066
.063
.056
Importance
Education
.072
.040
.065
Participation
.044
.046
.039
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 38. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 12 With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
4.073**
.053
Expertise
.094*
.055
.082*
Importance
.183**
.057
.161**
Expertise x
-.003
.056
.001
Importance
Explicit
-.219**
.056
.184**
Support
Explicit
-.191**
.061
.185**
Support x
Importance
Education
.016
.034
.015
Participation
.021
.040
.019
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 39. Model Specified In Hypotheses 11 And 13 With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
.0323**
.068
Expertise
.023
.069
-.033
Expertise x
.074
.062
-.063
Explicit
Support
Education
.075
.046
.066
Participation
.039
.039
.034
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 40. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 11 And 13 With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
4.098**
.055
Expertise
.091
.054
.082
Importance
.174*
.057
.161*
Expertise x
.093
.050
.097
Explicit
Support
Explicit
-.239**
.057
-.220**
Support
Explicit
-.1890*
.058
-.185*
Support x
Importance
Education
.016
.034
.012
Participation
.022
.040
.020
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 41. Expertise Predicting Tolerance With Controls In Study Two
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.264**
.223
Expertise
.181*
.087
.120*
Explicit
.843**
.076
.559**
Democratic
Values
Support
Accessibility
-.007
.075
-.004
of Democratic
Values
Education
.132**
.047
.146**
Participation
.034
.035
.051
R²
.438
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 42. Expertise Predicting Accessibility With Controls In Study Two
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
1.165**
.054
Expertise
.239**
.057
.265**
Explicit
.076
.057
.084
Democratic
Values
Support
R²
.092
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 43. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 24 With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
.022
.063
Expertise
.244**
.066
.221**
Explicit
.073
.064
.071
Support
Expertise x
-.068
.059
-.067
Accessibility
Education
-.046
.040
-.043
Participation
.009
.030
.008
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 44. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 26 With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.888**
.076
Expertise
.340**
.082
.324**
Explicit
.863
.078
.835
Support
Expertise x
.159
.081
.135
Explicit
Support
Accessibility
-.001
.077
-.001
Explicit
-.013
.080
-.012
Support x
Accessibility
Education
.130
.047
.122
Participation
.031
.035
.029
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 45. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 23 With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
.058
.061
Expertise
.269**
.062
.188**
Accessibility
.126
.063
.132
Expertise x
-.198**
.062
.195**
Accessibility
Education
-.036
.39
-.33
Participation
.039
.029
.037
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 46. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 25 With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.888**
.076
Expertise
.340**
.082
.324**
Explicit
.863
.078
.835
Support
Expertise x
.159
.081
.135
Explicit
Support
Accessibility
-.001
.077
-.001
Explicit
-.013
.080
-.012
Support x
Accessibility
Education
.130
.047
.121
Participation
.035
.035
.026
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 47. Expertise Predicting Tolerance With Controls In Study Three
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.468**
.380
Expertise
.244*
.103
.162*
Implicit
.038
.095
.025
Democratic
Values
Support
Accessibility
.195*
.091*
-.130*
of Democratic
Values
Education
.047
.060
.050
Participation
.117*
.047
.175*
Ideology
-.101
.061
-.103
R²
.141
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 48. Expertise Predicting Accessibility With Controls In Study Three
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
.291**
.055
Expertise
.015
.023
.043
Ideology
.036**
.015
.153**
R²
.025
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 49. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 36 With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
.001
.060
Expertise
.306**
.061
.287**
Accessibility
.023
.061
.018
Expertise x
.002
.064
.001
Accessibility
Ideology
-.069
.041
-.051
Participation
.059
.031
.057
Education
-.044
.040
-.039
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 50. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 39 With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.727**
.091
Expertise
.365**
.096
.307**
Accessibility
-.215*
.913
-.187*
Expertise x
.105
.099
.076
Accessibility
Implicit
.119
.096
.113
Support
Implicit
-.187*
.097
-.142
Support x
Accessibility
Ideology
-.096
.061
-.088
Participation
.122
.047
.109
Education
.045
.056
.452
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 51. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 37 With Controls.
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
.008
.066
Expertise
.041
.067
.023
Expertise x
-.025
.060
-.017
Implicit
Support
Ideology
.108
.060
.092
Education
-.040
.042
-.036
Participation
.044
.033
.042
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 52. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 38 With Controls
Variable
Model 1
B
SE B
β
Constant
3.66**
.093
Expertise
.380**
.094
.342**
Implicit
.236*
.10
.219*
Support
Expertise x
.243**
.085
.220**
Implicit
Support
Accessibility
-.197*
.089
.184*
Accessibility x
-.182*
.093
.163*
Implicit
Support
Ideology
-.110
.046
-.102
Participation
.109
.045
.089
Education
.042
.060
.044
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.
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